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PUBLIC CHOICE OR PUBLIC SPIRIT: TOWARD A MORE
COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF REGULATION

Gary R. Kitts, D.P.A.
Western Michigan University, 1995

This study examines the decisions made by state public utility regulatory
commissions from the perspectives of two primary theories of regulatory decisionmaking--the public choice and public spirit models. The public choice model posits
that an agency’s decisions are responsive to the pressures placed upon the
organization by competing external interest groups.

The public spirit model

postulates that an agency’s decisions reflect the relative values of those with authority
or influence within the organization. The study hypothesizes that each is incomplete
and proposes a process model based on variables derived from both theories.
The research analyzed 240 utility rate case decisions issued by 12 state
commissions over the 20-year period from 1974 through 1993. Each decision was
analyzed to determine the issues in dispute, the positions taken on each issue by
participating interest groups, and the commission’s decision on each issue. The logit
form of the probability model was applied to develop a regression equation in which
the probability of a specific commission decision on an issue was a function of
specific external and internal factors.
Statistically significant results were derived for the proportion of state product
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derived from manufacturing, the backgrounds of commissioners, and the position
adopted by the agency staff.

The results suggest that both internal and external

factors affect agency decision-making, but that internal factors predominate.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The boatman in A Man for All Seasons (Bolt, 1962, p. 29) complains that:
"From Richmond to Chelsea, it’s a quiet float downstream; from Chelsea to
Richmond, it’s a hard pull upstream.

And it’s a penny halfpenny either way.

Whoever makes the regulations doesn’t row a boat."
The boatman’s complaint has doubtless been echoed many times as
government has long been involved in the regulation of business.

According to

Phillips (1988, p. 82), the "Emperor, during the decline of the Roman Empire, issued
edicts setting maximum prices for some 800 articles, based upon their estimated cost
of production.

His edicts were supported by the Church Fathers under the ’just

price’ doctrine, a doctrine firmly established by the Middle Ages."

In Munn v.

Illinois (1877), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that:
it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this
country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common
carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, inn-keepers, etc., and
in so doing to fix a maximum charge to be made for the services
rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. (p. 125)
Regulation is commonly divided into "old style" or "economic" regulation,
which encompasses efforts by government to control prices, entry, exit, and
conditions of service in specific industries or economic activities, and "new style" or

1
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"social" regulation, which is concerned with societal goals regarding safety, health,
employment fairness, and related issues (Cook, 1988). Noll (1985) defines regulation
as governmental constraint of private economic decisions.

He identifies it as a

process with two key features: (1) alteration of the direction of economic activity in
a manner that is generally regarded as desirable to society, and (2) protection of
constitutional rights through compliance with elaborate procedural and evidentiary
rules.

Meier (1987) recognizes six forms of regulation: (1) determining the price

or range of prices that can be charged for a product, (2) using franchises or licenses
to determine who may participate in a given industry, (3) establishing of standards
for a product or production process, (4) directing the allocation of resources, (5)
providing operating subsidies, and (6) monitoring the marketplace to assure fair
competition.
According to Phillips (1988), for many years, regulation in this country was
accomplished by: (a) judicial decisions based on the common law, (b) direct
regulation by the legislature, or (c) municipal regulation through franchise
agreements.
However, the form of government regulation changed in 1887 with the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which established the independent
regulatory commission as a common administrative structure.

Since that time,

regulatory commissions have proliferated at the federal, state, and local level.
The purpose of the Interstate Commerce Commission was the regulation of
railroads in interstate commerce.

Similar state agencies were created to regulate
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intrastate railroads. About 1910, state regulation, often using the same agency, was
expanded to include authority over public utilities.
These state public utility commissions have become one of the most common
types of regulatory agencies.
Columbia.

They exist in all 50 states plus the District of

They have jurisdiction over electric, natural gas, and telephone

companies, and sometimes over other utilities, such as water, steam, or sewage, or
over other businesses, such as motor carriers, transportation, toll bridges, or
warehouses (Phillips, 1988). State utility regulatory commissions are composed of
three to seven commissioners, who are either appointed by the governor or elected
for terms ranging from four to ten years.

Table 1 (National Association of

Regulatory Utility Commissioners, 1993) provides a listing of state utility regulatory
commissions and a summary of their areas of utility jurisdiction (i.e., E =
Electricity, G = Gas, T = Telecommunications, W = Water, Se = Sewerage, and
St = Steam).

In addition to those jurisdictional areas shown in Table 1, some

commissions also have responsibility over other non-utility fields, most commonly
various forms of transportation.
State utility regulatory commissions generally have jurisdiction over the rates
charged by utilities and often have authority to limit utility formation by granting
franchises or certificates and by regulating the issuance of securities.

Although

normally part of the executive branch, these commissions are, at least in theory,
independent of the other branches of government.

Phillips (1988) suggests four

factors as important means for maintaining this independence: (1) commissioners are
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Table 1
Utility Regulatory Commissions

Agency

E

G

T

W

Se

St

Alabama Public Service Commission

E

G

T

W

Se

St

Alaska Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

W

Se

St

Arizona Corporation Commission

E

G

T

W

Se

St

Arkansas Public Service Commission

E

G

T

W

Se

-

California Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

W

Se

St

Colorado Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

w

-

St

Conn. Dept, of Public Utility Control

E

G

T

w

-

-

Delaware Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

-

-

D. C. Public Service Commission

E

G

T

-

Se

-

Florida Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Georgia Public Service Commission

E

G

T

-

-

-

Hawaii Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Idaho Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

-

-

-

Illinois Commerce Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Iowa Utilities Board

E

G

T

w

-

-

Kansas Corporation Commission

E

G

T

w

-

-

Kentucky Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-
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Table 1—Continued

Agency

E

G

T

W

Se

St

Louisiana Public Service Commission

E

G

T

W

Se

-

Maine Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

W

-

-

Maryland Public Service Commission

E

G

T

W

Se

St

Massachusetts Dept. Public Utilities

E

G

T

W

-

-

Michigan Public Service Commission

E

G

T

W

-

St

Minnesota Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

-

-

-

Mississippi Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Missouri Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

St

Montana Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

-

-

Nebraska Public Service Commission

-

-

T

-

-

-

Nevada Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

New Hampshire Public Utilities Comm.

E

G

T

w

Se

St

New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

E

G

T

w

Se

-

New Mexico Public Utility Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

New Mexico State Corporation Comm.

-

-

T

-

-

-

New York Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

-

St

North Carolina Utilities Commission

E

G

T

w

-

-

North Dakota Public Service Commission

E

G

T

-

-

-

Ohio Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

w

Se
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Table 1--Continued

Agency

E

G

T

W

Se

St

Oklahoma Corporation Commission

E

G

T

-

-

-

Oregon Public Utility Commission

E

G

T

W

-

-

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

St

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

w

-

-

South Carolina Public Service Comm.

E

G

T

w

Se

-

South Dakota Public Utilities Commission

E

G

T

w

-

-

Tennessee Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Texas Public Utility Commission

E

-

T

-

-

-

Texas Railroad Commission

-

G

-

-

-

-

Texas Water Commission

-

-

-

w

Se

-

Utah Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Vermont Public Service Board

E

G

T

w

-

-

Virginia State Corporation Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Washington Utilities & Trans. Comm.

E

G

T

w

-

-

West Virginia Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

Se

-

Wisconsin Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

-

St

Wyoming Public Service Commission

E

G

T

w

-

St

appointed or elected for terms of a definite length; (2) in most cases, commissioners
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cannot all be from the same political party; (3) removal from office is limited; and
(4) commissions must follow specified administrative procedures when making
decisions.
Regulatory commissions are quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial agencies. They
function under delegated power from the state legislature, but do so through formal
administrative hearings similar to those used in courts.

Utilities, customers, and

interest groups present their positions to the commission through these hearings. In
addition, the commission typically has a staff that participates in the hearings as a
party.

Upon completion of the hearings, the commission issues a formal written

decision, which may be appealed to the courts.
The most common reason given for the prevalence of utility regulation is that
utilities are natural monopolies. They have high fixed costs and significant barriers
to entry. Consequently, it would be inefficient for multiple utilities to compete for
a given group of customers. Instead a single utility is authorized to provide service,
but its rates are regulated by the state rather than by the market. Thus, regulation
is intended to serve as a substitute for competition.

How well it performs this

function is subject to debate and has fostered the development of a number of theories
of regulation.
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CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF REGULATION

Theories of social behavior are useful because they provide conceptual lenses
to view the actions of participants in a social process (Allison, 1971). Alternative
theories may emphasize different aspects of a process, or they may involve differing
assumptions about motivations of participants.

In either case, the presence of

competing theories helps to focus attention on important elements that might
otherwise remain unnoticed.
Many theories have been suggested to account for the decisions made by
government regulatory agencies. Of these, five stand out as being significant for the
development of a comprehensive view of regulatory behavior.

In approximate

chronological order of their development, these are: (1) Public Interest, (2) Life
Cycle, (3) Capture, (4) Public Choice, and (5) Public Spirit.

These are

representative of the types of theories that have been put forth, but they do not
provide an exhaustive list. Of course, the labeling of theories as being distinct is a
matter of judgment regarding what degree of difference is sufficient to separate
otherwise closely related concepts.

8
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Public Interest

For many years, the public interest theory provided the only conceptual basis
for understanding regulation. The public interest concept developed under English
common law and was adopted in this country through a series of court decisions in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The first significant case was Munn v. Illinois (1877), which involved a state
law regulating the storage of grain in warehouses. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
government regulation of what was otherwise private property was appropriate.
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community
at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest
in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created, (p. 126)
The Court based its conclusion on a review of the history of English common
law and the adaptation of those principles in the colonies.

It noted that "the

government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner
in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary
for the public good." (p. 125).

The Court also cited with approval the opinion

rendered two centuries earlier by the Lord Chief Justice Hale:
If the King or subject have a public wharf, unto which all persons that
come to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for the
purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the Queen, ...
or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out
where a port is newly erected; in that case there cannot be taken
arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, etc.,
neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the duties

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the King’s license
or charter. For now the wharf, and crane and other conveniences are
effected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris privati only;
as if a man set out a street in new building on his own land, it is now
no longer bare private interest, but is affected by a public interest, (p.
127)
Within twenty years of this decision, the public interest concept had come to
be widely accepted as the basis for government regulation of business. For example,
in Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. v. Kentucky (1896), the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that
the general rule holds good that whatever is contrary to public policy
or inimical to the public interests is subject to the police power of the
state, and within legislative control, and in the exertion of such power
the legislature is vested with a large discretion, which, if exercised
bone fide for the protection of the public, is beyond the reach of
judicial inquiry, (p. 700-701)
The use of government regulation for the protection of the public gradually
expanded.

In this process, the types of businesses affected with a public interest

were more formally defined. In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations
(1923), the U.S. Supreme Court summarized the scope of regulation in the public
interest as follows:
Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying some
public regulation may be divided into three classes:
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public
grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the
affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any
member of the public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers
and public utilities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public
interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has
survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or colonial
legislatures for regulating all trades and callings. Such are those of
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inns, cabs, and gristmills....
(3)
Businesses which, though not public at their inception, may
be fairly said to have risen to be such, and have become subject in
consequence to some government regulation. They have come to hold
such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed upon
them. In the language of the cases, the owner, by devoting his
business to the public use, in effect grants the public an interest in that
use, and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that
interest, although the property continues to belong to its private
owner, and to be entitled to protection accordingly, (p. 535)
The public interest theory of regulation is closely related to the concept of
natural monopoly. Under this concept, certain industries have characteristics such
that it is inefficient to have multiple firms competing in a given market. Typically,
these characteristics include high fixed costs coupled with attendant economies of
scale, price inelasticity, barriers to entry, and fluctuating demand. According to the
theory, a competitive market in an industry with these characteristics would be
expected to evolve into one with only a single survivor (Bonbright, Danielsen, and
Kamerschen, 1988). This survivor would then be able to exploit its customers due
to the lack of competition.1 It is this emphasis on the protection of consumers that
forms the basis for the public interest theory. According to Strick (1990, p. 18):
The public interest theory places emphasis on the protection of the
individual consumer and society. The emphasis is on the provision of
goods and services to the public as economically and efficiently as
possible, with the assurance that the public is made aware of the
attributes of these goods and services and is not misled or harmed in
the consumption and production process. Furthermore, the public
interest requires that the consumption and production process be
conducted in an environment that provides for the development and

1 Although the ability to do so may be quite limited if the market is contestable.
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982).
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provision of varied goods and services to meet changing consumer
tastes and demands. An environment that provides for technological
development can also be viewed as being in the public interest. In
summary, regulatory actions to promote the public interest are those
actions which create an economic climate that approximates, or that
moves the economy towards, perfect competition.
However, Mitnick (1980, p. 92) argues that the "forms taken by the ’public
interest’ in public interest theories can, as one would expect from the nature of the
concept, vary greatly."

Mitnick defines five forms of the public interest concept:

(1) a balance of contending or competing interests; (2) a compromise in which
various interests concede some portion of their objectives; (3) a trade-off in which
some interests provide a service to the public in exchange for certain private benefits;
(4) an overriding national or social goal that supersedes private interests; and (5) a
particularistic, paternalistic, or personal dictated concept, in which the public interest
is identified with the preferences of a particular person or group.
A similar view of the indeterminate nature of the public interest concept is
offered by Friedlaender (1981):
The "public interest" is inherently difficult to define, depending as it
does upon subtle trade-offs between considerations of economic
efficiency and income maintenance to affected groups. Rarely are
major policy changes unambiguously in the public interest, since they
necessarily involve changes in the income levels of the affected groups
as well as changes in the allocation of resources. Consequently, even
if a policy change may lead to a clear gain in economic efficiency and
income levels to certain groups, insofar as it may impose costs on
other groups, the losses must be considered against the gains before
it can be decided that such a change is in the public interest, (p. 131).
This point is expanded upon by Sharkey (1983), who notes that the public
interest theory is rarely stated in rigorous scientific form. He observes that
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13
the primary virtue of the public interest theory is also its primary
weakness. Regulation is unquestionably determined in a political
arena, but there is no mechanism in the public interest theory which
describes how specific regulations are chosen. Indeed, it is not even
clear how one might define the public interest given the presumed
heterogenous viewpoints represented by the public at large.
Ultimately the public interest theory is not itself a theory, but rather
a belief by its adherents that no such theory is possible, (p. 237)
According to the views espoused by Mitnick, Friedlaender, and Sharkey, the
public interest theory is an amorphous concept that, like beauty, appears to be in the
eye of the beholder.
Despite differences as to what it entails, from the earlier historical discussion,
it is clear that the public interest concept has long been the underlying basis for
regulation.

As such, it represents a normative theory regarding how regulation

should operate, not necessarily how it does (Peltzman, 1981).

The remaining

theories focus more closely on the actual performance of regulatory agencies.

Life Cycle Theory

Based on his observations of the history of regulatory commissions, Marver
Bernstein (1955) suggested that there exists a "general pattern of evolution more or
less characteristic of all." Bernstein proposed a four-stage life cycle for regulatory
agencies: (1) Gestation, (2) Youth, (3) Maturity, and (4) Old Age.
In the gestation stage, organized groups are formed to deal with a pressing
public problem that is regarded as sufficiently serious to require government action.
During this period, the struggle to establish regulation takes precedence over attempts
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to refine regulatory goals and basic policies.

The establishment of an agency

intended to solve the existing problem normally causes a decline in public concern
with the issue.
In its youth phase, the regulatory agency lacks experience and technical
resources compared with the groups to be regulated. However, the agency benefits
from its legislative mandate for reform of existing abuses. The agency must act
quickly while it still commands support from the public, as well as from the
administrative and legislative branches. Because of its lack of experience, the agency
is relatively free define its policies, standards of conduct, and procedures. During
this period, a crusading spirit pervades the agency.
During maturity, the agency undergoes a process of devitalization. At this
time, the agency has lost its original political support and vitality.

It becomes

attached to traditional routine policies and processes. The crusading spirit is lost as
the agency seeks to avoid conflicts and maintain good working relationships with
affected interest groups.

Rather than serving as an agent for change, the agency

becomes a defender of the status quo.
In old age, the regulatory agency comes to rely totally on time-worn policies
and procedures. The agency falls behind in its workload and is unable to keep pace
with changes in technology, the economy, and organizational development.

The

agency becomes completely passive and no longer able to vigorously pursue its
legislative mandate. The period of old age continues until some significant problem
calls public attention to the failure of the agency and results in a political
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reformulation of the agency.
Bernstein is not the only observer of the process of regulation to suggest a life
cycle theory of agency development. Downs (1972) argues for a five-part issueattention cycle. First, during the pre-problem stage, undesirable social conditions
exist, but the public has not yet become interested. Second, there is the alarmed
discovery and euphoric enthusiasm stage. The public suddenly becomes aware of the
problem and the major focus is on quick fixes that will resolve the matter without any
fundamental reordering of society. Third, there is a gradual realization that the cost
of solving the problem is very high and will require significant societal changes.
Fourth, some solution to the problem is created, often in the form of a new agency,
followed by a gradual decline in public interest in the problem. Finally, during the
post-problem stage, the issue is no longer a matter of public concern.
Jones (1974) indicates that federal air pollution policy-making proceeded
through a series of similar stages. In the 1950s and 1960s, the public showed little
interest in environmental matter and policy-making was conducted through a series
o f small incremental adjustments involving bargaining between governmental
decision-makers and the affected industries. About 1970, public perception of the
problem was greatly magnified and decision-making entered a period of speculative
augmentation—major policy decisions were made based on speculation that capabilities
would improve to meet the demands of the law. Jones noted that after active public
pressure wanes, the process would likely return to that of mutual role-taking and
incremental adjustment.
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In addition to government agencies, Shepard (1985) argues that public utilities
also go through a lifecycle consisting of four stages: (1) a rudimentary competitive
stage, in which the initial patents (if any) have expired and many small competitors
seek to enter the field; (2) rapid chaotic growth followed by the initiation of
regulation to bring order to the industry; (3) stability as regulation matures and the
industry’s market is saturated; and (4) reversion to non-monopoly conditions as new
forms of competition are developed.

Regulation is only viable in the first three

stages, if at all, but it may persist in the fourth.

Capture Theories

In Bernstein’s life cycle theory, a regulatory agency goes through a series of
stages so that, although it initially serves the public interest, the agency ends its life
as a captive of the regulated industry. Capture theories argue that throughout all or
at least most of its life, the regulatory agency serves the interest of the regulated
industry.
Huntington (1952) observed that the Interstate Commerce Commission
identified the public interest with the private interest of railroads which the agency
was responsible for regulating, a process known as clientalism.

Under this

circumstance, the agency ceases to be an impartial adjudicator o f competing interests
and instead becomes an advocate of the regulated interests.
Stigler and Friedland (1962) developed empirical evidence which could be
used to suggest that capture theories are more generally applicable than Huntington
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17
had argued. They compared states that had instituted regulation of electric utilities
with those that had not.

The study indicated that the presence or absence of

regulation had no effect on: (a) the average level of prices for electricity, (b) the
relative prices charged large and small users of electricity, and (c) the market value
of electric utilities.
Demsetz (1968) argued that Stigler and Friedland’s conclusion that regulation
had no discernable impact arises because the natural monopoly concept, which
provides the basis for the public interest theory, is faulty. Demsetz contended that
even under conditions which make it inefficient for more than one firm to operate,
there will still be many bidders competing to provide the service.

According to

Demsetz:
The determinants of competition in market negotiations differ from
and should not be confused with the determinants of the number of
firms from which production will issue after contractual negotiations
have been completed. The theory of natural monopoly is clearly
unclear. Economies of scale in production imply that the bids
submitted will offer increasing quantities at lower per-unit costs, but
production scale economies imply nothing obvious about how
competitive these prices will be. If one bidder can do the job at less
cost than two or more, because each would then have a smaller output
rate, then the bidder with the lowest bid price for the entire job will
be awarded the contract, whether the good be cement, electricity,
stamp vending machines, or whatever, but the lowest bid price need
not be the monopoly price, (p. 57)
Demsetz noted that prior to the initiation of utility regulation there were many
competing companies and concluded that the number of competing bidding rivals was
likely to be at least as great as in other industries in which unregulated markets work
tolerably well. Demsetz argued that a system which awarded a franchise to the utility
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offering the best package of price and quality of services would provide for market
competition without the need for a regulatory commission.

He suggested that

regulation was prompted more by the desire to avoid duplication of utility facilities
than by the need to control a monopoly.
Jarrell (1978) expanded on the work of Demsetz by examining the conditions
present at the time that state regulation of electric utilities was initiated.

Jarrell

analyzed electricity prices, gross utility profits, and electricity output per capita in
states that had initiated regulation of electric utilities by 1917 compared to those that
had not. He determined that just prior to the establishment of regulation, states that
had initiated regulation early had lower prices, lower gross profits, and higher output.
He concluded that regulation was intended to protect the interests of electric utilities
by providing them with monopolies protected from competition.

Public Choice

Mueller (1989, p. 1) defines public choice as "the economic study of
nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political
science." Under the public choice theory, government regulation is viewed as a form
of rent-seeking in which producers and consumers compete to obtain monopoly rents
controlled by the regulator.
That groups with opposing interests would seek to mold the government
process to their own end is not a new concept. In The Federalist No. 10 (1787),
Madison (writing as Publius) discussed the problem of resolving these competing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

private interests.
It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust
these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the
common good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm:
Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without
taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely
prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in
disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole, (p. 60)
Madison argued that competing interests (referred to as factions) generally
arise in the economic sphere and their resolution would be the primary task of the
new nation.
[T]he most common and durable source of factions, has been the
various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and
those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in
society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall
under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing
interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser
interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them
into different classes, actuated by differing sentiments and views. The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal
task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction
in the necessary and ordinary operations of government, (p. 59)
Madison placed little faith in what would come to be called the public interest
theory—it was not reasonable to expect that government decision-makers would act
in the public good simply out of virtue.
virtue in the new republic.

Instead, interest would play the role of

Under this concept, now commonly referred to as

pluralism, multiple interest groups compete in the public policy arena. The resulting
political decision is arrived at through a process of bargaining and compromise
among these groups that is assumed to reflect the interests of society as a whole.
Although the Founding Fathers were mindful of the role of private interests
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in developing public policy, that view was largely forgotten in developing theories
of regulation until the application of public choice concepts in the 1970s. The initial
developer of this approach was Stigler (1971) who proposed the economic theory of
regulation-that regulation was a commodity subject to the forces of supply and
demand, i.e., demanded by various interest groups and supplied by legislators and
regulators.

Stigler argued that the incentive of a party to seek to influence a

government decision increases with the stake that the party has in the outcome. In
addition, groups with a small number of individuals are easier to organize and thus
are more likely to seek to influence the process. In the regulatory process, producers
-w

are small in number and each has a large stake in the outcome. Conversely, there
are many consumers, so that it is difficult for them to organize, and each has a
relatively minor stake in the outcome.

Thus the regulatory process would be

expected to favor producers over consumers.

Posner (1974) contrasted Stigler’s

theory with the then-current public interest and capture theories.
Peltzman (1976) generalized Stigler’s argument by developing a decision
making model by which the regulator balances the competing interests of producers
and consumers.

In this model, regulatory decisions are based on the respective

marginal utilities of regulation to the various interest groups. The regulator sets the
price so that the marginal gain in support to the regulator from one interest group
equals the marginal loss from the other interest group. Any movement from this
position results in the marginal loss to the regulator exceeding the marginal gain.
Under the public choice model, the regulatory agency is a homogeneous
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"black box" in which pressures of competing interest groups are balanced according
to a well-defined calculus so as to maximize the resulting support (or minimize the
resulting pressure) experienced by the agency. The model admits a wide variety of
outcomes depending upon the relative marginal utilities of the competing interest
groups. When viewed in this light, capture theories become special cases in which
the marginal utility for one interest group (e.g., producers) is very large while that
of the other competing group is very small.

Public Spirit

The public spirit model focuses on the values of persons with authority to
make decisions (Kelman, 1987). Under this model, the policy-making process is
dominated by the fact that political decisions affect the entire community. The public
spirit model does not deny that private interests have an impact on the process.
Rather, it argues that the reach of private interest is circumscribed by the limits of
good public policy. According to Kelman, under the public spirit view:
self-interest by no means disappears from public life. It is far too
powerful a motivating force in human behavior for that. But public
spirit has a pride of place that translates into an important role in the
policy-making process. When self-interested participants express their
arguments in terms not of their personal interests but rather as good
public policy, this is more than the compliment that vice pays to
virtue. The requirement to express arguments in such terms limits the
extent of what self-interested advocates can demand.
It also
constitutes acceptance of a criterion against which their arguments are
to be judged that makes it easier to reject them. (p. 247)
According to the public spirit model, the policy-making process incorporates
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a broad public interest perspective which focuses on values.

However, decision

makers do not consider a large number of values when evaluating alternatives, but
only one or a few. This reduces the decision to manageable proportions and avoids
difficult calculations of tradeoffs. As a result, the crucial issue is what values the
decisiori-maker considers. Political debate thus becomes a contest to influence the
values of the participants.

Under this model, the dominant factor in determining

regulatory choices is the value system of the decision-maker.

Unlike the public

choice model, which treats the regulatory agency as a homogeneous "black box", the
public spirit model treats the regulatory agency as a heterogeneous mix of individuals
in which decisions are based upon the relative values of those with authority or
influence. The public spirit model is a more formalized variant of the public interest
theory in that it provides a basis for choosing which options serve the public interest.
The public spirit theory, as expounded by Kelman, is similar to Wilson’s
(1980) theory of regulatory politics. Based on analysis of nine different regulatory
agencies, Wilson rejected the contention that private interests alone could explain
their functions. According to Wilson:
A complete theory of regulatory politics-indeed, a complete theory of
politics generally—requires that attention be paid to beliefs as well as
interests. Only by the most extraordinary theoretical contortions can
one explain the Auto Safety Act, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the
[Occupational Safety and Health Act], or most environmental
protection laws by reference to the economic stakes involved. And
even when these stakes are important, as they were in the case of
electric utility regulation, the need for assembling a majority
legislative coalition requires that arguments be made that appeal to the
beliefs (as well as interests) of broader constituencies, (p. 372)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

With respect to the behavior of regulatory agencies, Wilson notes that some
act in a manner that appears to serve the interests of the regulated sector, but that
other agencies often choose stricter or more costly regulatory standards over more
lenient ones. Wilson notes that
the behavior to be explained is complex and changing; it cannot easily
be summarized as serving the interests of either the regulated sector
or the public at large. To account for this, I suggest we view these
agencies as coalitions of diverse participants who have somewhat
different motives, (p.373)
Wilson classifies these participants into three categories: (1) careerists, who
identify their careers and rewards with the agency; (2) politicians, who expect to have
a future in elective or appointive office outside the agency; and (3) professionals,
who value status from organized members of similar occupations elsewhere. The
relative strengths of these participants combined with the political environment within
which regulatory agencies operate govern their behavior.
Coadunate with Kelman’s public spirit theory is an organizational model
suggested by Gormley (1983). Patterned after Allison (1971), Gormley’s model:
views regulatory agencies as organizations that produce policy outputs
in accordance with standard operating procedures or routines. It
portrays administrative decisions as efforts by agency officials to
maximize personal or professional values, subject to limited time,
skill, and knowledge. It stresses the primacy of specialization and
division of labor, as opposed to unity of command and centralized
authority. It does not deny the presence of outside pressure but sees
administrative expertise as a shield that reduces susceptibility to such
pressure, (pp. 134-5)
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24
The Five Models

These five models are based on different assumptions about human motivation
and organizational behavior.

Over the last two decades, they have formed the

primary basis for many empirical studies of regulation which are summarized in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER III

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF REGULATION

Most of the empirical research into the theories of regulation has focused on
state commission regulation of public utilities. According to Priest (1993), there are
three basic reasons why researchers have centered their attention on public utility
commissions:

(1) regulation by commission is the most sustained form of

government interference in the marketplace; (2) public utilities have long been
operated and regulated as natural monopolies; and (3) except for a limited number
of federal commissions, the principal form of commission regulation is state
regulation of public utilities. This chapter reviews the literature on this topic based
upon the subject matter of the individual studies. The next chapter will consider the
inferences that may be drawn from these investigations.

Electric Utilities

Studies of regulation of electric utilities have predominated over other types
of public utilities, such as telecommunications, natural gas, and water. The earliest
empirical study of electric utility regulation not only predated, but also formed much
of the basis for, the formulation of the diverse theories.
As previously mentioned, Stigler and Friedland (1962) analyzed the impact
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of regulation on the prices, rate structures, and market value of electric utilities.
They were not interested in commission regulation per se, but rather in the larger
question: does regulation have any impact on utility rates? Prior to 1910, electric
utilities were regulated by state commission in only six states.1 By 1920, they were
regulated in 35 states.

Thereafter, the number of regulated states increased by

approximately two per decade. Stigler and Friedland used the fact that some states
regulated while others did not to develop a model to measure the impact of
commission regulation. In this model, electricity prices were modeled as a function
of: (a) urban population, (b) the utility’s price of fuel, (c) the proportion of power
derived from hydroelectric sources, (d) per capita state income, and (e) the presence
or absence of state regulation. Regression equations were derived using data from
1912, 1922, 1932, and 1937. No regulation effect was observed for 1912, 1922, or
1932. In 1937, the regulation variable was significant for commercial and industrial
customers, but not for residential customers.
Stigler and Friedland also compared the ratio of monthly bills for large and
small users of electricity in regulated and unregulated states to determine if regulation
had any impact on cross-subsidization between customer classes.

No effect of

regulation was detectable. Finally, they analyzed the growth in market values of 20
electric utility stocks from 1907 through 1920 as a function of growth in sales during
this period and the number of years of regulation. The regulation variable was not

1 However, Priest (1993) indicates that in many of the other states, electric
utilities were regulated by local governments.
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statistically significant.
The Stigler and Friedland study was updated by Jackson (1969) to consider
electric utility prices in 1940, 1950, and 1960.

He found that regulation was

statistically significant in reducing commercial and industrial prices in all three years,
but that it reduced residential prices only in 1960. Jackson suggested that regulation
had no effect on residential rates before 1960 because during that period electric
utilities had declining costs and voluntarily reduced rates.
The most recent study of this type was performed by Denning and Mead
(1990), who analyzed electric prices in regulated and unregulated states in 1960,
1965, and 1969 through 1979.

Their model considered electric prices for five

customer classes (small and large residential, commercial, industrial, and combined)
as a function of: (a) fuel price (significant for all classes), (b) per capita personal
income (significant for all classes), (c) percentage of capacity from hydroelectric
sources (not significant for any class), (d) percentage of capacity from investor-owned
utilities (not significant for any class), (e) whether a state commission had jurisdiction
over rates (significant for small residential and commercial classes only), and (f)
population density (significant for small residential class only).

The authors

concluded that public utility regulators transfer wealth from industrial and large
residential customers to commercial and small residential customers, consistent with
the cross-subsidization hypothesis.
The previous studies had a common theme in that they sought to analyze the
impact of regulation by comparing electricity prices in states with and without
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regulation by a state commission. The remaining studies approach the subject with
a variety of research questions regarding how regulation is performed in practice.
Based on observations of the regulatory history of 133 electric utilities,
Joskow (1974) concluded that: (a) the primary concern of regulatory commissions
has been to keep nominal prices from rising, not to regulate rate of return per se; (b)
regulatory commissions are generally content to do nothing if interest groups are not
complaining; and (c) consumer groups are content if nominal prices are constant or
falling. He concluded that the regulatory environment during the 1950s and 1960s
had been characterized by a stable balance of interest groups reflecting the fact that
electric prices were declining during this period in large part because of economies
of scale. During the 1970s, as a result of significant increases in interest rates and
the cost of fuel, this balance was destroyed—utilities were unhappy with low or even
negative earnings, consumer groups were opposed to price increases, and
environmentalists were dissatisfied with regulatory structures that encouraged demand
growth.
Hagerman and Ratchford (1978) analyzed the allowed rate of return on equity
granted to 79 electric utilities in 33 states. They developed three regression equations
(differing only in the method of measuring prevailing interest rates) in which the
allowed rate of return was a function of: (a) the utility’s beta coefficient, which is
a measure of financial risk (not significant); (b) the utility’s debt to equity ratio,
another measure of risk (significant at the .05 level in two of the three equations);
(c) the utility’s asset size (significant at the .05 level in one equation); (d) whether
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the state commission applied allowed returns to book value or fair value of the rate
base (significant at the .05 level in all equations); (e) prevailing interest rates
(significant at the .01 level in two of the equations and at the .06 level in the third);
(f)

annual compensation of state commissioners (not significant);

(g) the

commissioners’ term of office (significant at the .05 level); (h) whether the
commissioners were elected or appointed (not significant); and (i) the number of
members of the commission (not significant). The regression coefficients ranged
between .64 and .70. The authors concluded that the allowed rate of return was
primarily affected by economic variables; political variables played a minor role.
Anderson (1981) conducted a comparative case study of policy making at the
New York Public Service Commission and the California Public Utilities
Commission. In the late 1970s, both agencies considered the adoption of lifeline
rates (reduced rates that provide a basic level of service for indigent customers). In
both cases, commissioners favored lifeline rates that were opposed by the commission
staff, the utilities, and industry. Anderson concluded that lifeline was successful in
California because: (a) there was testimony and active support for the concept from
public interest groups in the Commission’s formal hearing, (b) commissioners
appointed by the previous administration had been so ardently pro-business that the
public supported a change, and (c) the decision required little assistance from the
agency’s staff to implement.

Anderson notes that a prior effort in California to

reduce case processing time had failed because that required cooperation from the
staff. According to Anderson, the "chief difference between the two cases is the
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presence or absence of a bureaucratic problem-the need to induce cooperative
behavior in order to achieve policy objectives." (p. 169).
In New York, lifeline failed because:

(a) consumer groups were not as

skillful in supporting the concept as they had been in California; (b) the New York
Commission had been more consistently moderate than the California Commission,
thus not engendering the public outcry for a change; and (c) the New York
commissioners were interested a variety of objectives so that lifeline was relatively
less important.
Anderson concludes that regulatory agencies have a dual nature. When faced
with complex, technical tasks (such as speeding up the case process), the bureaucratic
nature of the agency asserts itself.

When faced with making a single choice among

competing values (such as the lifeline decision), the political nature of the agency
becomes important.
Mann and Primeaux (1983) examined the electric rates charged by 113 electric
utilities for the years 1967, 1973 and 1979.

Using regression analysis, they

developed equations for ten different price categories as a function of: (a) system
scale, (b) distribution costs per kilowatt-hour sales, (c) tax payments per kilowatthour sales, (d) production costs, and (e) method of regulator selection. The method
of regulator selection was significant for three of the ten categories in 1973 and 1979,
but was not significant for any category in 1967. The authors concluded that the
"1973 and 1979 statistical results confirm a price difference which can be attributed
to the commissioner selection method." (p. 24).
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Harris and Navarro (1983) examined electricity prices for 110 electric utilities
in 1980. They developed a regression equation in which the average electric price
was a function of: (a) the average kilowatt-hour sales per customer (significant), (b)
state and local taxes as a percentage of revenues (significant), (c) the percentage of
regional electricity generated from oil (significant), (d) the percentage of regional
electricity generated from hydropower (significant), (e) population density (not
significant), and (f) commissioner selection method (not significant). The authors
conclude that:
These results show that the hypothesis of lower rates in states with
elected commissioners must be rejected. When isolated from the
effects of other wholly independent determinants, the coefficient on
commissioner selection process is not significantly different from zero.
(p. 26)
Crain and McCormick (1984) examined regulated electricity prices in 1967
as a function of: (a) price of natural gas (significant at the .05 level), (b) whether
commissioners were elected or appointed (not significant), (c) per capita income
(significant at the .05 level), (d) state population (significant at the .05 level), (e)
installed electric generating capacity per plant (significant at the .01 level), (f)
average fuel cost (significant at the .01 level), (g) ratio of average generation to
capacity (not significant), and (h) ratio of exports of electricity to imports (significant
at the .05 level). Their analysis indicated that the method of selecting commissioners
had no effect on price of electricity.
Crain and McCormick also performed a similar analysis of natural gas prices
as a function of: (a) price of electricity (significant at the .01 level), (b) whether
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commissioners were elected or appointed (significant at the .01 level), (c) per capita
income (not significant), (d) state population (not significant), and (e) amount of
proven natural gas reserves (significant at the .01 level).

Unlike the case of

electricity, this analysis indicated that the method of selecting commissioners was a
significant variable and that elected commissioners were associated with lower gas
prices. They concluded that the impact of producer and consumer interest groups
was different in the two cases.
Finally, Crain and McCormick found that the average rates of return
authorized for electric utilities in 1967 were lower in states with elected
commissioners than in those, with appointed commissioners.
Primeaux, Filer, Herron, and Hollas (1984) analyzed factors that affect the
hostility of public utility commissions to competition in the electric industry. They
used two definitions of hostility:

(1) commissions indicating in response to a

questionnaire that competition was not allowed or would not be permitted were
classified as hostile, and (2) commissions in states where there were two or more
combination gas and electric utilities were classified as hostile. For both definitions,
a model was developed using primarily 1971 data, in which hostility was a function
of:

(a) whether commissioners were elected or appointed (significant at the .05

level), (b) manufacturing value added per firm (significant at the .05 level), (c) the
ratio of natural gas produced to electricity sold in the state (significant at the . 10 level
under the first definition but not significant under the second), (d) the ratio of the
monopoly price of electricity to the actual price for residential customers (significant
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at the .01 level), and (e) state per capita income (significant at the .01 level). The
authors concluded that the "Stigler-Peltzman hypothesis that numerous groups will
benefit from regulation is generally supported; however, it appears that elected
commissioners are more likely to favor a competitive policy" (p. 182). They also
concluded that regulated firms had the greatest influence on commission policies,
producers of substitutes the second greatest, followed by large industrial users of
electricity. The more diffuse residential consumer interest had the least impact.
Hickel (1984) analyzed the trend in average retail electric prices for
residential, commercial, and industrial customers from 1970 through 1982. He found
that commercial (small business) customers were charged more than residential
customers from 1974 through 1982, even though the costs to serve each class were
approximately the same. Industrial customers had a lower cost of service and were
charged significantly less. The author concluded that this was due to the differing
abilities of the customers to participate in rate cases before state commissions:
Residential and industrial customers generally have an active
voice in the rate-making process. Industrial customers who rely
heavily on the use of electricity in their manufacturing processes may
have a full-time staff member whose job it is to monitor the state ratemaking proceedings. Residential customers, who carry a large number
of votes in the state political process, usually have private consumer
groups to represent them in the rate-making procedure. In addition,
virtually all states in the United States have a consumer affairs office
that represents the residential consumer in state rate-making
proceedings.
It is usually the small business electricity user who is left
voiceless in the state rate-making proceeding. The structure of the
small business economy, combined with the barriers inherent in the
rate-making procedure, usually preclude effective small business
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participation in that procedure-and it is that preclusion that probably
accounts for the ever-increasing gap in small business electric utility
rates, (p. 29-30)
Wenders (1986) compared the long-run marginal cost of electric power with
the commission-authorized marginal price for five large electric utilities between 1978
and 1984. He found that the residential class was charged 82.8% of the marginal
cost to serve that class, while the commercial and industrial classes were charged
111.5% and 112% respectively.
marginal cost.

He also found that overall prices were below

He concluded that "the regulatory process has appropriated the

intramarginal rents and quasi-rents of the electric power industry and redistributed
these to the industry’s most potent political constituency-its consumers." (p. 322).
Paul and Schoening (1991) explored the extent to whi h third-party
organizations can affect rates set for electric utilities. Using data from 38 utilities,
they developed a model in which the average electric bill for a typical large
commercial customer was a function of: (a) the level of power purchases by the
utility, (b) the amount of nuclear power used by the utility, (c) the amount of
hydroelectric power generated by the utility, (d) consumption at the time of peak
load, (e) the number of substations operated by the utility, (f) the number of
distribution stations operated by the utility, (g) whether commissioners were elected
or appointed, and (h) the number of organizational categories for which charitable
contributions were allowed in the operating costs of the sampled utilities.
variables were significant at the .10 level.

All

The authors concluded that elected

commissioners are associated with lower electric rates and that "rent-seeking activities
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are not limited to simple contests between producer and consumer groups.

This

empirical test appears to support the inclusion of third-party interests in the regulatory
process and provides additional evidence for Peltzman’s theory of regulation." (p.
192).
Delorme, Kamerschen, and Thompson (1992) explored the use of Ramsey
pricing in the nuclear power industry. Based on a concept developed by Ramsey
(1927), rates for each customer class are set above marginal cost in proportion to the
inelasticity of demand for each class, i.e., the most inelastic demand has the highest
markup.

Ramsey pricing is a "second-best" pricing rule applicable in situations

where marginal cost pricing would recover less than the company’s total cost of
service.
Following Nelson (1982), Delorme, Kamerschen, and Thompson identified
Ramsey pricing as being in accord with the public interest theory. Using 1985 data,
they developed a model in which the relative deviation from Ramsey prices for
industrial and residential customers was a function of:

(a) the percentage of

electricity generated by nuclear power (significant at the .01 level); (b) the ratio of
the number of residential to industrial customers (significant at the .05 level); (c) the
percentage of total electric output used by residential customers (not significant); (d)
the percentage of total electric output used by industrial customers (significant at the
.10 level); (e) total utility assets (significant at the .10 level); (f) whether
commissioners were elected or appointed (not significant); (g) whether consumer
interests were represented by a state official (not significant); (h) the ratio of the
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number of residential customers to industrial customers in states where consumer
interests were represented by a state official, zero otherwise (significant at the .10
level); and (i) a dummy variable equal to one if commissioners were elected and
consumer interests were represented by a state official (not significant). The authors
concluded that "anti-nuclear coalitions appear to be effective since residential users
receive more favorable Ramsey-number treatment than industrial users, when more
electricity is generated from nuclear sources" (p. 394).
Atkinson and Nowell (1994) analyzed revenue increases granted to electric
utilities during the period 1980-1984 and the length of time that those rate cases
lasted. They developed a model in which the rate increase granted by the agency was
a function of: (a) the rate of return authorized by the agency (not significant); (b)
the agency’s budget (not significant); (c) the rate of inflation (not significant); (d)
whether the commission had granted an interim rate increase during the pendency of
the case (not significant); (e) the length of time since the utility’s last rate increase
(not significant); (f) whether commissioners were elected or appointed (significant at
the .05 level); (g) the length of a commissioner’s term in office (not significant); (h)
the rate increase requested (significant at the .05 level); and (i) the utility’s rate base,
i.e., the amount of capital invested in electric utility plant assets (significant at the
.05 level).
Atkinson and Nowell also developed two models of the length of time required
to decide a rate case. These models used common variables but differed in the way
they defined the time required. The time lapse was analyzed as a function of: (a)
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the rate of return authorized by the agency (significant at the .05 level in one model,
but not significant in the other); (b) the agency’s budget (significant at the .05 level
in both models); (c) the rate of inflation (not significant); (d) whether the commission
had granted an interim rate increase during the pendency of the case (significant at
the .05 level in one model but not significant in the other); (e) the length of time
since the utility’s last rate increase (significant at the .05 level in both models); (f)
whether commissioners were elected or appointed (significant at the .05 level in one
model but not in the other); and (g) the length of a commissioner’s term in office (not
significant).
Atkinson and Nowell concluded that appointed commissioners tend to be
associated with both shorter case processing times and larger rate increases, both of
which tend to benefit the utility rather than maximizing social welfare.
Caudill, Im, and Kaserman (1993) developed regression equations to analyze
seven models of the rate of return on equity authorized for 99 electric utilities by
state regulatory commissions during the period 1980-84.

First, under the simple

capture theory, the authorized return is a function of one variable, the return request
by the utility (significant at the .05 level). The adjusted regression coefficient in this
model is .43. Second, under the public interest theory, the authorized return is a
function of the return recommended by the commission staff (significant at the .05
level). The adjusted regression coefficient is .62. In the third, fourth, fifth, and
sixth models, labeled as "split the baby" models, the commission’s authorized return
is a function of differing weights applied to the utility’s requested return and the
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staff’s (or intervenor’s) recommended return. All but one of the variables in these
models are significant at the .05 level and the adjusted regression coefficients vary
between .65 and .58. The seventh model is the economic theory of regulation. The
authorized return here is a function of:

(a) the utility’s requested rate of return

(significant at the .05 level), (b) the square of the utility’s requested return
(significant at the .05 level), (c) the staff’s recommended return (significant at the .05
level), (d) the utility’s regulatory expenditures per unit of electricity sales (significant
at the .05 level), (e) whether the regulatory climate in each state is favorable or
unfavorable (significant at the .05 level), (f) the length of the commissioners’ term
of office (not significant), and (g) the number of members on each commission (not
significant). The adjusted regression coefficient for this model is .72. Based on the
F-test of the seventh model against the others, the authors concluded that their study
provides empirical support for the economic theory of regulation.

State Regulation of Other Public Utilities

Joskow (1972) developed a model of the rate of return phase in a formal
regulatory process and applied that model to decisions of the New York Public
Service Commission in gas and electric rate cases. In this model, the rate of return
allowed by the commission was a function of: (a) the rate of return requested by the
utility; (b) whether the utility presented testimony on its cost of equity; (c) whether
an intervenor presented testimony on rate of return and the degree of conflict between
the intervenor and the utility; (d) whether it was a gas or electric utility; (e) whether
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the commission had previously commended the firm for its efficiency; and (f) a
combination variable incorporating the utility’s embedded cost o f debt, its estimate
of the cost of equity capital, whether it was a combination company, and whether it
had its own capital structure. All variables were found to be significant at the .05
level except for the efficiency variable (item e). Joskow concluded that the New
York Commission behaves in a consistent fashion and that decision rules for
regulatory agencies should be observable using standard statistical techniques.
Navarro (1982) analyzed the factors that affect whether the regulatory climate
o f a state regulatory commission is hostile, neutral, or favorable to utilities. The
regulatory climate for each state commission (the dependent variable) was a
composite developed from the rankings of five Wall Street rating agencies. Using
logit analysis, Navarro developed a model in which the likelihood of a regulatory
climate favorable to utilities was a function of: (a) whether commissioners were
elected or appointed (not significant); (b) the length of a commissioner’s term of
office (not significant); (c) the percentage of the commission’s expenditures raised
from the general tax fund (significant); (d) the percentage of oil use in electricity
generation for states with a fuel adjustment clause, zero if no such clause (not
significant); (e) commissioner’s salary (significant); (0 whether the state has a statute
requiring that some or all commissioners be professionally qualified (not significant);
(g) the commission’s expenditures per capita (not significant); (h) the percentage of
commissioners who are Democratic (not significant); and (i) whether the state is
located in the south (not significant). Navarro concluded that commissions "with
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directly elected commissioners, below-average salary structures and expenditure
levels, short commissioner terms, and a heavy reliance on general revenue funding,
are much more likely to exhibit an unfavorable regulatory climate than [those] with
the opposite characteristics." (p. 135).
Gormley (1983) surveyed 270 individuals in 12 states who participated in state
utility commission proceedings to determine their assessment of the influence of
different types of participants on the final commission decision.

This survey

indicated that the commission staff had the highest perceived influence with an
average rating of 8.15 on a scale of one to ten, with ten representing the highest
influence.
were:

The other types of participants with the corresponding average rating

utility companies (7.43), proxy advocacy groups (7.03), business groups

(4.65), grassroots advocacy groups (4.36), municipalities (3.70), labor groups (3.05),
and individual citizens (2.81).
Gormley also developed nine regression equations designed to measure the
effects of public advocacy on different types of utility commission decisions. The
dependent variables were:

(1) the rate increase granted to electric utilities as a

percentage of the amount requested, (2) whether the commission adopted lifeline rates
designed to help poor residential customers meet minimal energy needs, (3) whether
the commission adopted a ban on the imposition of penalties for late payment of
utility bills by residential customers, (4) whether the commission required a grace
period before disconnection of residential customers for non-payment of utility bills,
(5) the ratio of the price of electricity for a residential customer using 500 kilowatt-
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hours (kwh) per month to the price for an industrial customer, (6) the same ratio for
a customer using 250 kwh per month, (7) whether the commission had adopted timeof-day electricity rates for business customers, (8) whether the commission had
adopted seasonal electricity rates, and (9) whether the commission had adopted rates
for interruptible electrical service. The independent variables were: (a) a dummy
variable indicating whether grassroots advocate groups were active in the state; (b)
a dummy variable indicating whether proxy advocates were active in the state; (c) an
interval level variable designed to measure the political culture in the state; (d) the
commission’s regulatory resources as measured by its staff size, budget, salary levels,
and data processing capability; and (e) whether the commissioners were elected or
appointed. Table 2 summarizes the significance of the independent variables for each
dependent variable. Gormley concluded that:
The policy impacts of public advocates vary from issue area to issue
area, depending upon the technical complexity of an issue and the
extent to which the issue fragments the consumer class. When an
issue is highly complex, grassroots advocates will lack the resources
to participate effectively. When an issue is highly conflictual with
respect to consumers, proxy advocates will lack incentives to
participate effectively, (p. 172-173).
Crew, Kleindorfer, and Schlenger (1987) conducted a regression analysis of
the rate case results for 86 water utilities. After dividing their sample into large and
small companies, they derived a model in which the annual rate increase authorized
by the commission was a function of: (a) the time elapsed since the last rate case
(significant at the .01 level for large companies, not significant for small companies);
(b) the number of intervenors involved in the case (not significant); (c) the rate
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Table 2
Effects of Public Advocacy According to Gormley (1983)

Grass
Roots

Proxy

Culture

Regulator
Resources

Rate Increase

N.S.

pc.io

N.S.

£<.05

N.S.

Lifeline Rates

pc.io

N.S.

j2<.05

N.S.

N.S.

Late Payment

£<.01

£< .05

£<.01

£<.10

£<.05

Grace Period

N.S.

£< .01

£<.05

N.S.

N.S.

500 kwh Residential

N.S.

N.S.

N.S.

£<.05

N.S.

250 kwh Residential

N.S.

N.S.

N.S.

£<.05

N.S.

Time-of-Day Rate

N.S.

N.S.

£< .05

£<.01

N.S.

Seasonal Rates

N.S.

N.S.

£<.10

£<.10

N.S.

Interruptible Rates

N.S.

pc.io

£<.10

N.S.

N.S.

Dependent
Variable

Method of
Selection

increase requested by the utility (significant at the .01 level); (d) the number of
customers served by the utility (significant at the .01 level for large companies, not
significant for small companies); (e) a subjective estimate of the value of internal
management time spent on the rate case (not significant); (f) the transaction costs of
all intervenors in the case (significant at the .05 level for large companies, not
significant for small companies); and (g) whether the rate case was litigated or settled
(significant at the .01 level for large companies, not significant for small companies).
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The adjusted r-squared was .82 for small companies and .81 for large companies.
The authors concluded that most of the variation in the allowed rate increase was
explained by the amount requested. Furthermore, "regulators and companies behave
as if they were participants in a game in which the commission grants them some
fixed fraction of what they request minus a flat-rate reduction." (p.58).
Barkovich (1989) conducted a case study of the efforts by the California
Public Utilities Commission to promote energy conservation during the period 1975
through 1984. She concluded that the Commission’s action was due in part to the
rise of public-interest groups, who favored energy conservation. They neutralized
the previously dominant position held by public utilities opposed to conservation.
The other significant factor was that the commissioners were able to implement their
strategies without bureaucratic constraint because of a shared ideology between
commissioners and staff leading to bureaucratic support. Finally she concluded that
the appointment of commissioners who supported conservation was critical to the
introduction of that regulatory strategy.
Schmandt,

Williams,

and Wilson

(1989)

directed

case

studies

of

telecommunications policymaking subsequent to the divestiture of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). The states included in their studies
were California, Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, New York, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
and Washington. The conclusions reached as a result of the studies were: (a) that
telecommunications policy is no longer solely in the hands of regulators, but also is
significantly affected by legislators, governors, and economic development officials;
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(b) that policymakers recognize the importance of telecommunications infrastructure
to the state’s economy; (c) that greater attention is being given to issues of social
equity and universal service; and (d) that states have begun to give more
consideration to their role as users of telecommunications services.
Teske (1990) analyzed the policy decisions made by state commissions
regarding telephone pricing and competition after the AT&T divestiture. Using logit
regression, he developed two models: (1) a pricing model in which the dependent
variable was whether a commission either reduced intrastate toll rates or established
unbundled intrastate residential subscriber access charges, and (2) a competition
model in which the dependent variable was whether a commission authorized
facilities-based, intra-LATA competition.2

For each dependent variable, two

regression equations were derived with the following independent variables: (a) the
number of headquarters of Fortune Service 450 companies in the state (significant at
the .05 level in one pricing equation, at the . 10 level in one competition equation, not
significant in the other two); (b) a proxy for grass-roots advocates (not significant);
(c) a proxy for government-funded proxy advocates (not significant in the pricing
equations, but significant at the .05 level in the competition equations); (d) whether
the state was served by U.S. West (significant at the .05 level in one competition
equation, at the .10 level in one pricing and one competition equation, and not
significant in the remaining pricing equation); (e) the percentage of households served

2 LATA is an acronym standing for Local Access Transport Area. In general,
a LATA is approximately the same as a telephone area code.
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by cable television (not significant); (f) the net flow of funds into or out of the state
from the National Exchange Carriers Association pool (not significant); (g) average
access loop costs (not significant); (h) whether the state had elected or appointed
commissioners (not significant in one pricing and one competition equation, and not
used in the remaining two); (i) the size of the state commission’s budget (significant
at the .05 level in one pricing equation, not significant in one competition equation,
and not used in the remaining two); (j) whether the Legislature is controlled by
Democrats or Republicans (significant at the . 10 level in one pricing equation, at the
.05 level in one competition equation, and not used in the remaining two); and (k)
the state’s regulatory climate (significant at the .05 level in one pricing equation, not
significant in one competition equation, and not used in the remaining two). The
logit regression classified 42 of the 49 cases correctly in the pricing model and
classified 44 of 49 correctly in the competition model. The author concluded that this
evidence supported institutional theories of regulatory policy over simple interest
group theories.
Noll and Smart (1991) considered the early responses of state commissions to
the divestiture of the AT&T system. They observed that: (a) after the announcement
of divestiture, local telephone companies had requested large rate increases which had
been granted by state regulators; (b) most states attempted to limit competition for
long-distance and network access service; (c) residential and business rates were
higher in large exchanges (urban areas) than in small exchanges; (d) business rates
had increased more than residential rates; (e) rates in populous states had changed the
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least since divestiture; and (f) access charges were lower in large states than in small
states. They concluded that these observations revealed the complexity of the politics
of regulatory policy-the protections against competition support the capture theory,
while the special provisions for large users in large states support the influence of
organized buyer interests.
Cohen (1992) analyzed the ratio of urban residential telephone rates to
business flat rates in states during the period 1977 to 1985 as a function of: (a) the
percentage of telephones in the state that were in the Bell network (not significant),
(b) the percentage of telephones that were business lines (not significant), (c) the
number of members of Common Cause per 10,000 population (significant), (d) the
research resources of the state commission (not significant), (e) whether the
commissioners were covered by conflict of interest provisions (not significant), (f)
whether the commissioners were elected or appointed (not significant), (g) the
number of commission employees (significant), (h) whether the commission was an
arm of the executive branch (significant), (i) the political party of the governor (not
significant), (j) an index of gubernatorial power (not significant), (k) a measure of
the level of grassroots advocacy (not significant), (1) whether the commission was an
arm of the legislature (not significant), (m) the number of licensing powers that the
commission possessed (not significant), (n) the percentage of Democrats in the
legislature (significant), (o) whether a legislative committee had authority to review
rules (significant), (p) legislative salaries (not significant), (q) the percentage of
households in the state with telephones (not significant), (r) the percentage of the
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state’s population living below the poverty level (significant), (s) a measure of the
level of proxy advocacy (not significant), (t) the number of safety aspects that the
commission regulated (not significant), (u) whether the state was located in the south
(not significant), (v) whether the state had a restriction on the amount of time
required between a commissioner leaving the commission and beginning employment
in a regulated firm (not significant), and (w) the percentage of the state’s population
living in urban areas (not significant). Cohen concluded that private interest variables
had little direct affect.

The analysis suggests "not capture but bureaucrats

implementing their own policy preferences, which in this case just happens to
coincide with business interests." (p. 107).
Kaserman, Mayo, and Pacey (1993) analyzed the factors that affect the
decisions of state commissions regarding the regulation of long-distance telephone
service by AT&T. They developed a model in which the decision to remove rate-ofreturn regulation by 1989 was a function of: (a) the proportion of business WATS
lines to total telephone lines in the state (significant at the .10 level), (b) the per
capita interstate subscriber plant (not significant), (c) the percent of the state’s
population residing in urban areas (not significant), (d) whether the commission was
elected or appointed (significant at the .10 level), (e) the number of commission staff
members (significant at the .05 level), (f) the number of commission staff members
involved primarily in telecommunications (significant at the .05 level), (g) whether
or not bills supporting long-distance telephone deregulation had been enacted by the
legislature (significant at the . 10 level), (h) AT&T’s share of the long distance market
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(not significant), (i) the number of firms certified to provide long-distance service in
the state (not significant), and (j) the percent of households in the state that had
telephone service (not significant). The model had a pseudo-r-squared of .416 and
produced 33% false positives and 53% false negatives. The authors concluded that
the research "does lend some empirical support to the fundamental premise that
regulatory bodies are responsive to the myriad interest groups affected by their
decisions." (p. 60).
Baumann, Iledare, Mesyanzhinov, and Pulsipher (1994) analyzed the factors
that affected natural gas prices in Louisiana in 1990 and 1991. The developed a
model in which the average retail price for each of the gas distribution utilities in that
state was a function of:

(a) the average acquisition cost the utility paid for gas

(significant at the .075 level), (b) the volume of gas sold per customer (significant at
the .01 level), (c) the number of customers per mile of system pipeline (not
significant), (d) the proportion of residential to commercial customers (significant at
the .05 level), (e) whether the utility was large or small (significant at the .01 level),
and (f) whether the utility was regulated by the state commission or by local
government (significant at the .01 level). The authors concluded that variations in
prices could not be adequately explained by cost variables and "the principal
implication of our results is that the pattern of natural gas prices in Louisiana does
not fit well with the pattern one would expect to find if regulation were based on the
realities of the natural gas marketplace." (p. 22).
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Federal Agencies

Krasnow and Longley (1973) conducted four case studies of decision-making
at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC):

(1) the allocation of radio

spectrum space to FM radio and broadcast television, (2) the reallocation of television
channel assignments between VHF and UHF stations, (3) a proposed policy designed
to control the number and frequency of advertisements broadcast by radio and
television stations, and (4) a decision to refuse to renew the license of a Boston
television station and instead to grant the license to a competing applicant. Based on
these case studies, the authors concluded that: (a) in order to initiate and implement
a policy successfully, the FCC needed support from either the regulated industry or
Congress, or both if the Commission itself was divided; (b) because of the conflicting
goals of different interest groups, the prevalent decision-making pattern was one of
mutual adjustment and compromise; (c) division within any interest group severely
weakened its effectiveness; (d) the FCC generally sought only modest, sequential
changes in policy that could be reversed, if necessary, more easily than sweeping
innovations; and (e) the FCC tended to focus on short-term problems that could be
resolved with the least amount of difficulty.
Breyer and MacAvoy (1974) analyzed the ratemaking policies of the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) regarding natural gas pipelines during the 1960s. First,
they estimated the effective price reductions resulting from FPC surveillance and
concluded that these reductions were not much greater than the cost of regulation.
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Second, they compared the rate of return allowed by the FPC with the estimated cost
of capital from alternative investments and concluded that the FPC allowed higher
rates of return. Third, they compared the standards used for rate design and found
that they varied from case to case, but that differences in price could not be
accounted for by variations in cost. Finally, they compared regulated prices set by
the FPC with estimated prices in an unregulated market and found that they did not
vary consistently. The authors concluded that:
adjudication is a clumsy tool for hitting economic targets. We neither
propose a theory of regulatory failure nor believe that our findings
conclusively prove or disprove any such theory. Yet those findings
are suggestive; they cannot easily be explained through single-variable
theories, such as bad management or industry capture. Theories that
take account of multiple causes, especially causes embedded in the
nature of bureaucracy and the adjudicative process, have far greater
explanatory power, (p. 132).
Gormley (1979) analyzed voting patterns at the FCC based on 299 nonunanimous votes from July 1974 through June 1976 on three issue areas (broadcast
license renewals, broadcast program content, and broadcast-cable conflicts).

He

found that former broadcasters were more likely than other commissioners to support
the broadcasting industry’s position in all three issue areas.

He also found that

Republican commissioners were more likely than Democratic commissioners to
support the broadcast industry’s position and that party differences were more
significant than differences based on prior employment.
Barton (1979) conducted a conditional logit analysis of decisions by the FCC
in 38 comparative broadcast licensing decisions. Prior to these decisions, the FCC

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

had issued a policy statement on the factors that in the agency’s view should be used.
Based on that policy statement, the independent variables used in the analysis were:
(a) the presence of an auxiliary power supply (not significant), (b) the number of
hours broadcast weekly (significant at the .05 level), (c) the number of hours of news
programming (not significant), (d) the percent of programming duplicated by other
local stations (not significant), (e) the size of the area served by the transmitter (not
significant), (f) the applicant’s percentage ownership of other local broadcast stations
(significant at the .05 level), (g) the applicant’s percentage ownership of non-local
broadcast stations (not significant), (h) the applicant’s percentage ownership of local
newspapers (not significant), (i) the applicant’s percentage ownership of non-local
newspapers (not significant), (j) whether the applicant was local (significant at the
.025 level), and (k) the availability of other broadcast stations (significant at the .10
level). This model predicted 24 of the 38 cases correctly. The author concluded that
the FCC relied heavily upon the criteria specified in its policy statement.
Eckert (1981) analyzed the pre- and post-commission employment history of
the 174 commissioners appointed to the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, or the FCC from each agency’s inception through December 31,
1977. He found that prior to appointment to the commission, 48% had experience
in a related public-sector job, while 21 % had previously held a related private sector
job. After leaving the commission, 51 % took related private-sector jobs, while only
11 % of all ex-commissioners took related public-sector jobs. The author concluded
that "service on a commission is clearly a stepping-stone to private-sector jobs related
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to the regulated industry." (p. 118).
Phillips and Zecher (1981) analyzed the impact of the regulation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the commission rates charged on the
purchase and sale of shares of stock on the New York Stock Exchange. Between
1971 and 1975, the SEC phased out the fixed commission system in favor of
negotiated rates. Phillips and Zecher compared commissions charged under the fixed
rate system with estimated amounts that would have been charged under a market
system. They found that institutional investors had been charged more under the
fixed commission system, while individual investors had been charged less. Because
institutional investors were becoming more important in the late 1960s and early
1970s, while individual investors were becoming less so, the authors concluded that
the SEC was reacting to changes in power of the interest groups and that the
regulatory pattern was consistent with the public choice theory.
Quirk (1981) conducted interviews with 50 high ranking officials in four
federal regulatory agencies: the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Highway Transportation
Administration.

The purpose was to reveal motivations underlying the decision

making process. Quirk found some limited evidence that prior employment in the
regulated industry led to pro-industry attitudes. However, party affiliation was much
more important, with Democrats much more likely than Republicans to have anti
industry attitudes.
Faith, Leavens, and Tollison (1982) examined the policy process at the
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) by analyzing the ratio of dismissals to antitrust
cases brought and to antitrust complaints filed against companies based on whether
the company’s headquarters were located within the district of a Congressman or
Senator who served on a subcommittee with oversight over the FTC. During the
1960-69 period, the authors found that dismissals were significantly more likely in
the case of House subcommittees (at the .10 level for cases and the .01 level for
complaints), but there was no significant difference in the case of Senate
subcommittees. During the 1970-79 period, House subcommittee membership was
a significant variable (at the .05 level for cases and .01 level for complaints), but
Senate subcommittee membership made no significant difference.

The authors

concluded that their study supported the private-interest theory of FTC behavior.
Moe (1982) analyzed the impact of the presidential administration upon three
independent regulatory commissions: National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the
FTC, and the SEC. He developed a series of regression equations with the following
dependent variables: (a) backpay awarded to workers by the NLRB, (b) the ratio of
notice actions posted against unions to those against employers by the NLRB, (c)
orders issued by the NLRB requiring that collective bargaining be entered into, (d)
number of complaints issued by the FTC, (e) criminal cases filed with the Justice
Department by the SEC, and (f) injunctions filed with the courts by the SEC. The
independent dummy variables were the: (a) Eisenhower administration (significant
at the .05 level in all six equations); (b) Kennedy-Johnson administration (significant
at the .05 level in five equations, not significant in the sixth); (c) Nixon-Ford
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administration (significant at the .01 level in one equation, at the .05 level in two
others, and not significant in the remaining three); and the (d) Magnuson-Moss Act
(used only in the FTC equation and significant at the .05 level).

The adjusted

regression coefficients ranged from .61 to .90. Moe concluded that the research
provided "a quantitative basis for believing that aspects of commission performance
do vary systematically across administrations and that the nature of variation is
consistent with gradual, partisan-directed presidential impact." (p. 221).
Chubb (1983) conducted case studies of federal regulation during the 1970s
of the nuclear power industry by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and of
the petroleum industry by the Federal Energy Administration and its successor, the
Economic Regulatory Administration (collectively FEA/ERA). He concluded that
decision-making at the NRC was influenced by both the President and Congress, but
that the President had greater influence. Prior to 1977, environmental interest groups
had relatively little input into the NRC’s decision-making process, but NRC
commissioners paid more attention to outside interest groups thereafter, primarily as
a result of a change in Presidential leadership. However, Chubb concluded that "the
staff of the NRC was decidedly pro-industry; the only groups enjoying working
relationships with the agency represented producer interests; and the agency’s
decision making exhibited the pro-cost-bearer biases of capture." (p. 251).
With respect to petroleum regulation, Chubb concluded that FEA/ERA
administrators were responsive to policy preferences of the President but only slightly
to Congress. Unlike the NRC, which relied primarily on formal processes to receive
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input from interested groups, the FEA/ERA relied primarily on informal processes.
According to Chubb, the "strong consensus among corporate lobbyists, trade
association representatives, and public interest advocates was that the probability of
altering a proposed oil regulation through hearing participation was negligible." (p.
141). Since informal representation was paramount, the FEA/ERA was co-opted by
large petroleum interests which had available resources to maintain close and frequent
contacts with the agency’s administrators and staff.
Weingast and Moran (1983) analyzed the impact of Congress upon the FTC’s
initiation of three types of cases (credit cases, textile cases, and Robinson-Patman
cases) relative to merger cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which was
considered a benchmark. Using logit analysis, they developed an equation for each
type of case in which the probability of a case occurring relative to the benchmark
was a function of: (a) the FTC’s budget (significant at the .01 level in two equations
and at the .05 level in the third equation); (b) the mean rating by the Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA) of members of the House subcommittee that oversees the
FTC (significant at the .01 level in two equations, not significant in the third); (c) the
ADA rating for the House subcommittee chair (significant at the .01 level in one
equation, at the .05 level in another, and not significant in the third); (d) the mean
ADA rating in the Senate (significant at the .01 in all three equations); (e) the mean
ADA rating of the Senate subcommittee (significant at the .01 level in two equations,
at the .05 level in the third); and (f) the ADA rating of the Senate subcommittee chair
(significant at the .01 level in two equations, at the .05 level in the third). The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

authors concluded that the evidence supports the hypothesis that Congress may
influence agency choices and that the FTC is sensitive to changes in its oversight
subcommittee and in its budget.
Altrogge and Shughart (1984) examined the factors that affect the level of civil
penalties imposed by the FTC. Using data from 57 civil penalty cases from 1979 to
1981, they developed a model in which the size of the penalty was a function of: (a)
the annual sales of the respondent, (b) the sales of firms violating Section 5(1) of the
FTC Act, (c) whether or not the violation involved section 5(1) of die FTC Act, (d)
whether or not the case involved the subsidiary of a larger firm, (e) whether or not
the respondent was considered able to pay, (f) whether or not the fine was paid in
installments, (g) whether or not the violation was considered to have caused
substantial consumer injury, (h) whether respondent was said to have acted in good
or bad faith, (i) whether or not additional remedial measures were taken, (j) whether
or not the violation involved cigarette advertising practices, and (k) whether or not
the violation involved enforcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.

All

variables were significant at the .01 level except the one relating to consumer injury.
The regression coefficient was .85. The authors concluded that the model largely
explains the factors that enter into the determination of civil penalties and that small
firms are assessed proportionately greater fines than large firms.
Anderson and Glazer (1984) examined the effect of public opinion on the
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) issuance of airworthiness directives
(instructions to airplane manufacturers or operators to take certain actions designed
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to improve safety). They constructed a model in which the number of directives was
a function of three factors, each of which was lagged by zero to five two-month
periods, for a total of 18 variables (six variables for each o f two factors).

The

factors were: (1) the number of newspaper articles relating to aviation safety (two
variables significant at the .05 level, four not significant); (2) the number of domestic
airline accidents and incidents (two variables significant at the .01 level, a third
significant at the .05 level, the remaining three not significant); and (3) the number
of domestic trunk departures (one variable significant at the .05 level, five not
significant). The authors concluded that:
the FAA issues fewer rather than more airworthiness directives after
it obtains new information regarding safety hazards. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that a regulatory agency protects the
interests of the industry it regulates. In addition, the FAA appears to
respond to the concerns of the general public, even though such
responsiveness may damage the agency’s effectiveness in improving
aviation safety, and even though this serves the interests of no
particular interest group, (p. 193).
Amacher, Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) analyzed the activities of
the FTC to test the prediction of the public choice model that regulatory agencies will
buffer producer losses during contractions and attenuate producer gains during
expansions. They developed regression equations in which the dependent variables
were: (a) the number of Robinson-Patman Act cases during the period 1937-1981,
(b) the same variable during the period 1948-1981, (c) the number of FTC cases not
involving Section 2 of the Clayton Act during the period 1915-1981, and (d) the same
variable during the period 1948-1981.

For dependent variables (a) and (c), they
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developed three regression equations for each using different combinations of
independent variables; for dependent variables (b) and (d), they developed one
equation for each (a total of eight equations). The independent variables were: (a)
real gross national product (significant at the . 10 level in one equation, not significant
in a second, not used in the remaining six); (b) unemployment rate of the civilian
labor force (significant at the .05 level in two equations, not used in the remaining
six); (c) business failure rate (significant at the .10 level in one equation, not
significant in a second, and not used in the remaining six); (d) excess capacity rate
(significant at the .05 level in two equations, not used in the remaining six); (e) real
annual FTC appropriations (significant at the .01 level in three equations, not
significant in the remaining five); (f) a linear time trend (significant at the .01 level
in three equations, at the .05 in three others, and not significant in the remaining
two); and (g) the square of a linear time trend (significant at the .01 level in all eight
equations). The authors conclude that:
in business contractions the FTC moves to cushion producers losses
by increasing the number of complaints issued under the RobinsonPatman Act, which serves to limit the tendency for prices to fall. This
result can be rationalized under the view that the FTC is in the
business of transferring wealth from consumers either to protect small
business or to shore up cartels, (p.20).
Higgins and McChesney (1987) examined the factors affecting decisions by
the FTC to initiate a case against a firm. They developed four regression equations
in which the dependent variable was the number of advertising substantiation cases
brought by the FTC against firms in a product market. The independent variables
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were: (a) the mean advertising expenditures by firms in the market (not significant
in two equations, not used in the other two); (b) the coefficient of variation in
advertising expenditures within the market (significant at the .05 level in two
equations, not used in the other two); (c) the mean number of product lines by firms
in the market (not significant in two equations, not used in the other two); (d) the
coefficient of variation in number of product lines in the market (significant at the
.025 level in one equation, at the .05 level in another, and not used in the other two);
(e) the number of firms with advertising expenditures less than one standard deviation
below the mean (not significant in one equation, not used in the others); and (f) the
number of firms with total sales below $1 million (not significant in one equation, not
used in the others). The regression coefficients were .08 in one equation and .07 in
each of the other three.

The authors concluded that the FTC’s advertising

"substantiation doctrine is used to redistribute wealth from marginal to inframarginal
firms, as predicted by the economic theory of regulation." (p. 199).
Cook (1988) conducted a case study of the process by which the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implemented a system of emissions trading
that was supported by the President and Congress. The professional staff of the EPA
was divided into two camps: (1) attorneys and environmental engineers, who favored
a command and control approach that relied on a bureaucratic and legal approach to
environmental protection; and (2) economists and policy analysts, who favored
approaches based on the use of economic incentives to improve efficiency while
protecting the environment. Historically, the first group had been in charge of the
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agency’s administrative process, and it was necessary to implement organizational
change before the EPA was also able to effectively achieve its emission trading goals.
According to Cook:
When professional ideologies serve as guides for evaluative judgments
about public policy, as appears to be the case in particular
administrative agencies ..., the fulcrum for policy debate shifts from
interests to ideas. Ideologically driven policy deliberations tend to
focus on alternative conceptions of the public interest and the broader
public good and the most effective ways to achieve the public interest,
given one’s view of the world. What matters then are the policy
alternatives themselves, that is, the ideas and how they fit into the
professional ideology of the decision maker, (p. 141).
West (1988) analyzed the average length of regulations and explanatory
material published in the Federal Register by four federal agencies: the Food and
Drug Administration, the FCC, the FAA, and the EPA. He found that the length of
explanatory detail almost doubled between 1966 and 1986 because more external
influences needed to be recognized and accommodated by the agencies.
West also surveyed 160 officials from eight federal agencies: the EPA, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Products Safety
Commission, the FAA, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the
FTC, the Food and Drug Administration, and the SEC. The purpose was to analyze
differences in decision-making attitudes between lead office staff, executives, policy
analysts, and general counsel regarding:

(a) anti-regulatory sentiment, (b) the

inappropriateness of political considerations, (c) the importance of economic analysis,
(d) reliance on statutory goals rather than individual views of the public interest, and
(e) the importance of enabling legislation. The author concluded that significant
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differences exist between various internal decision-makers regarding the criteria to
be used in setting policy.
Hedge and Jallow (1990) analyzed the enforcement actions taken by the Office
of Surface Mining (OSM) in 23 states during 1979 and 1980.

They developed

regression equations to estimate the number of inspections, notices of violations, and
cessation orders for each year (a total of six equations). The independent variables
were:

(a) average mine production (not significant); (b) state spending per

inspectable unit on surface mining regulation (significant at the .01 level in two
equations, at the .05 level in another, at the . 10 level in one other, and not significant
in the remaining two); (c) the political party of the governor (significant at the .05
level in one equation; not significant in the others); (d) state per capita spending on
environmental protection (not significant); (e) citizen complaints per inspectable unit
(not significant); (f) coal employment (significant at the .01 level in one equation, at
the .05 level in three others, and not significant in the remaining two); (g) the percent
vote for Carter in 1976 (not significant); (h) unemployment rate (significant at the .05
level in one equation, not significant in the others); (i) whether the state was
represented on the House Interior Committee (significant at the .05 level in two
equations, not significant in the others); 0) whether the state was represented on the
Senate Energy Committee (significant at the . 10 level in one equation, not significant
in the others); (k) League of Conservation voter scores for the state’s Congressional
delegation (not significant); (1) the number of regional OSM inspectors per
inspectable unit (significant at the .01 level in four equations, not significant in the
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others); and (m) the OSM regional inspector vacancy rate (significant at the .01 level
in two equations, at the .05 level in two others, and not significant in the remaining
two). The authors conclude that decisions on how vigorously to regulate depend
upon organizational dynamics and the influence of some interest groups and political
actors.
Coate, Higgins, and McChesney (1990) analyzed the relative impact of
bureaucratic (i.e., agency staff) and political influence on the decisions of the FTC
to challenge mergers between 1982 and 1987. They developed a model in which the
probability of challenging a merger was a function of:

(a) whether the agency’s

lawyers and economists considered the industry to be highly concentrated (two
variables, each significant at the .10 level); (b) whether they claimed that barriers to
entry were low in the industry (significant at the .05 level for lawyers and at the . 10
level for economists); (c) whether the lawyers and economists claimed that the
industry was conducive to collusion (both variables significant at the .05 level); (d)
whether the lawyers claimed that a failing-firm doctrine was applicable (not
significant); (e) the amount of attention that a proposed merger had received in the
press (significant at the .05 level); and (f) the number o f times that FTC
commissioners or staff were called to testify before congressional committees
(significant at the .05 level). The authors concluded that the FTC’s decisions on
mergers were influenced by the views of the agency’s staff and by the desires of
politicians.

Both staff lawyers and economists were influential in the decision

process, but lawyers had greater influence.
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Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) analyzed the factors associated with
dissenting opinions by members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
The FOMC is the agency of the Federal Reserve System responsible for security
transactions associated with national monetary policy. It is composed of members
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and representatives of six of the twelve
Federal Reserve Banks. Havrilesky and Schweitzer developed a model in which the
decision of an individual committee member to favor a policy that was more or less
restrictive than the committee majority was a function of: (a) whether or not the
member was a President of a Federal Reserve Bank (significant at the .01 level), (b)
years employed in government (not significant), (c) years employed at the Federal
Reserve Board (significant at the .01 level), (d) years employed as an economist (not
significant), (e) years employed as a lawyer (not significant), (f) years employed in
private industry (not significant), (g) years employed in private banking (significant
at the .01 level), (h) years employed as an academic (significant at the .01 level), and
(i) years employed at a Federal Reserve Bank (significant at the .05 level). The
authors concluded that occupational backgrounds are a significant element in FOMC
voting and that those members whose career characteristics reflect greater proximity
to the federal government tend to favor less restrictive monetary policy.
Gildea (1990) also developed a model of the factors affecting the decision
making of FOMC members. Unlike the previous study, this analysis involved all
votes of committee members (not just dissents) and incorporated factors other than
members’ career variables. Gildea intended that his approach would be consistent
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with both economic theory and political science literature.

He applied two

methodologies (ordinary least squares regression and either logistic regression or
discriminant analysis) to each of four sets of data to develop a total of eight
equations. The dependent variable was the percentage of noncontractionary votes cast
by an individual committee member. For discriminant and logistic analyses, this was
converted to a binary variable with the dividing line being 40 percent
noncontractionary votes.

The independent variables were:

(a) the average

presidential approval rating (significant in one of the eight equations); (b) the average
presidential disapproval rating (significant in five equations); (c) the average
congressional disapproval rating (significant in two equations); (d) the inflation rate
divided by the sum of the unemployment rate and the real interest rate (not
significant); (e) the growth in money supply during the most recent six months
divided by the average growth in the previous five years (not significant); (0 the
political party of the appointing President (significant in one equation); (g) whether
the member was appointed by President Ford (significant in one equation); (h)
whether the member was serving an uncompleted partial term (significant in three
equations); (i) years in government (significant in one equation); (j) years on the
Federal Reserve Board staff (significant in one equation); (k) years in private industry
(significant in three equations); (1) whether the member was President of a Federal
Reserve Bank (significant in one equation); (m) whether the member had a Ph.D. in
economics (significant in three equations); (n) years as an academic (significant in
one equation); (o) whether the Board chairman was William Martin (not significant);
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(p) whether the Board chairman was Arthur Burns (significant in two equations); (q)
the political affiliation of the member (significant in two equations, not used in the
remaining six due to lack of data); and (r) whether the member had an Ivy League
education (significant in two equations). Gildea concluded that:
The results of testing this model ... appear to strongly support the
basic framework that a politically imposed economic constraint and
members’s preferences seem to consistently influence the voting
behavior of FOMC members. Specifically, it appears that members
are quite responsive to the constraint imposed on them by the president
and/or the current state of the economy, (p. 223).
Garvey (1993) presented a case study of organizational change in a public
bureaucracy based on his experiences computerizing the rate-making procedures at
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). This case study suggests that
the complexity of economic regulation provides agency staff with substantial
discretion to alter the ratemaking process in ways that the commissioners may not
approve. Garvey found that as a result of working together, day-to-day, numerous
"understandings" had developed between FERC staff and the regulated companies,
thereby resulting in a shared industry culture. Garvey concludes that issue networks
develop among regular participants in order to reduce the administrative transactions
costs associated with regulation.

Transportation

Eckert (1973) compared the regulation of taxicabs by independent regulatory
commissions and by traditional bureaucratic agencies. He found that: (a) there was
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no significant difference between the two in occurrence of taxicab monopolies; (b)
commissions were more likely to engage in forms of quotas or market divisions
(significant at the .01 level); (c) commissions were more likely to require uniform
rates (significant at the .01 level); and (d) commissions were more likely to prohibit
driver rental contracts, a form of cab leasing (significant at the .05 level).

He

concluded that "regulation by commissioners will tend to be relatively passive and
disinterested, and their conception of the ’public interest’ will, more often than not,
differ from that of bureaucratic officials." (p. 88).
Boucher (1991) analyzed the decision-making behavior of the Quebec
Transportation Commission-an agency that controls entry into the Province’s for-hire
trucking industry. Using data from 1976-1980, he developed a model in which the
likelihood of granting a permit to a trucking firm to initiate or expand operations was
a function of: (a) whether the permit was restrictive (significant at the .05 level), (b)
whether the firm had a written contract with a customer (not significant), (c) whether
the request was for a new or expanded permit (significant at the .05 level), (d) three
variables classifying the firm by size (two of them significant at the .05 level), (e)
whether existing trucking companies opposed the request (significant at the .05 level),
(f) whether the applicant agreed to restricting amendments (significant at the .05
level), (g) whether the request would generate new traffic (significant at the .05
level), and (h) whether new territories or new activities were involved (not
significant).

Boucher concluded that protection of established trucking firms

dominated the agency’s decision process and that large firms were more successful
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than small firms in obtaining approval to expand.
Langbein and Wilson (1994) studied the revenues of concessions at airports
operated by governmental or quasi-governmental bodies with authority to set and
enforce price ceilings. Because airport authorities normally receive a percentage of
the revenue collected from concessions, the authors believed that the authorities
would not have an incentive to restrict price increases.

In a survey of 50

concessions, one-third reported a maximum price that they were allowed to charge;
of those, 85 % indicated that the maximum was enforced. When price ceilings were
set and enforced, revenues were lower than when they were not, but the difference
was not statistically significant. The authors concluded that the airport authorities’
responsibility to protect travelers from monopoly power was in conflict with their
desire to maximize their own revenues by keeping prices high.

Other Public Policy Areas

Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980) analyzed environmental protection and landuse regulation by the California Coastal Commissions.

They constructed a

hierarchical regression model in which a commissioner’s rate of voting for denial of
land-use permits was a function of: (a) the population in the commissioner’s district,
(b) the proportion of the commissioner’s constituency in the planning area, (c) acres
of parks and forests per capita, (d) the vote of the commissioner’s constituency on
coastal preservation, (e) whether the commissioner was elected or appointed, (f) the
commissioner’s attitude toward coastal degradation as determined by survey, and (g)
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whether the agency staff supported or opposed the permit. The adjusted regression
coefficient was .86. The authors concluded that citizen participation was the best
single predictor of a commissioner’s behavior.
Miles and Bhambri (1983) interviewed insurance commissioners and members
of their staff in twelve states. Based on these interviews, they concluded that there
were two types of commissioners: (1) activists, who viewed their role as an agent
or representative of the public interest; and (2) arbiters, who viewed their role as
mediating between competing interest groups with conflicting priorities.

They

concluded that: (a) urban commissioners were more likely to be activists, while rural
commissioners tended to be arbiters; (b) Democrats were more likely to be activists,
while Republicans were more often arbiters; and (c) appointed commissioners were
more often activists, while elected ones tended to be arbiters.

Prior experience

working for insurance companies appeared to have no impact. They also found that
states with a majority of activist commissioners were generally viewed by other
commissioners as having: (a) more adversarial relations with the insurance industry,
(b) a higher number of company insolvencies, (c) greater consumer activism, (d) a
higher turnover of commissioners and policies, and (e) more pioneering legislation.
The authors concluded that the philosophy of commissioners plays a major role in
how government regulation of business is formulated and implemented.
Fenn and Veljanovski (1988) studied the enforcement actions taken as a result
of factory inspections by the Health and Safety Executive in Great Britain. Using
logit regression analysis, they developed a model of the decision to take enforcement
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action as a function of:

(a) whether the visit was a special rather than a routine

inspection, (b) an inspection priority rating based on prior experience with the
factory, (c) the regional unemployment rate, and (d) growth in employment for that
type of industry. All variables were found to be significant. The authors concluded
that the agency attempted to take a more accommodating approach when economic
activity was experiencing a downturn. Past experience with the firm’s management
was also a significant determinant in enforcement actions.
Makkai and Braithwaite (1992) analyzed the factors that affect the attitudes
and performance of nursing home inspectors in Australia. Based on a survey of 173
inspectors, they developed data on the degree to which each inspector:

(a) was

sympathetic to the problems of nursing homes, (b) identified with the industry, and
(c) believed in tough enforcement of standards. Using these as dependent variables,
they developed regression equations with the following independent variables: (a) age
(significant at the .01 level in one equation, not significant in the other two); (b)
gender (not significant); (c) total inspections made (not significant); (d) time worked
as an inspector (significant at the .05 level in one equation, not significant in the
other two); (e) prior nursing home experience (not significant); (f) prior experience
as a director or deputy director o f a nursing home (significant at the .01 level in one
equation, not significant in the other two); and (g) desire to work in a nursing home
in the future (significant at the .01 level in one equation, at the .05 level in the
second, and not significant in the third). The adjusted regression coefficients were
.09, .01, and .05 respectively.
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The authors then developed a regression equation in which the compliance
ratings given to nursing homes by inspectors was a function of: (a) total inspections
made (not significant), (b) time worked as an inspector (not significant), (c) prior
nursing home experience (not significant), (d) prior experience as a director or deputy
director of a nursing home (not significant), (e) desire to work in a nursing home in
the future (not significant), (f) whether the inspector had subsequently left the agency
(significant at die .05 level), (g) whether the inspector was sympathetic to the
problems of nursing homes based on the survey (not significant), (h) whether the
inspector identified with the industry based on the survey (significant at the .05
level), and (i) whether the inspector believed in tough enforcement standards based
on the survey (not significant). The adjusted regression coefficient was .32. The
authors concluded that "captured regulatory attitudes and revolving door variables
have little power ... in explaining the toughness of actual enforcement practices." (p.
61).

Summary

This chapter has summarized the empirical studies that have been conducted
to investigate one or more aspects of the theories of regulation. In the following
chapter, the information from these studies will be organized to focus on those
themes that will be examined in this research.
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CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH THEMES

Chapter III presented a detailed description of the empirical studies of
regulation. Those studies cover a broad array of differing subjects, research designs,
and relevant variables.

This chapter will synthesize the information previously

discussed to provide a more coherent picture of the results derived from the research.
First, the studies will be grouped according to the level of government, type of
industry, and method of study. Second, the studies will be analyzed to determine the
types of variables that could impact regulatory decision-making.

Types of Studies

Table 3 categorizes the studies summarized in Chapter III.

The column

labeled "government" specifies the level of government being studied (i.e., federal,
state, local, or other).

At the federal government level, the column labeled

"industry" represents the agency being studied. These are identified by acronym, as
follows: Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Consumer Products Safety Commission
(CPSC), Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA), Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), Federal Energy Administration (FEA), Federal Open Market
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Table 3
Regulatory Research Studies

Study

Government

Industry

Method of Study

Altrogge & Shughart (1984)

Federal

FTC

Statistical

Amacher, Higgins, Shughart
& Tollison (1985)

Federal

FTC

Statistical

Anderson (1981)

State

Electric

Case Study

Anderson & Glazer (1984)

Federal

FAA

Statistical

Atkinson & Nowell (1994)

State

Electric

Statistical

Barkovich (1989)

State

Utility

Case Study

Barton (1979)

Federal

FCC

Statistical

Gas

Statistical

Baumann, Iledare,
State
Mesyanzhinov & Pulsipher (1994)
Boucher (1991)

Other

Motor Carr.

Statistical

Breyer & MacAvoy (1974)

Federal

FPC

Quantitative

Caudill, Im & Kaserman (1993)

State

Electric

Statistical

Chubb (1983)

Federal

NRC, FEA,
ERA

Case Study

Coate, Higgins &
McChesney (1990)

Federal

FTC

Statistical

Cohen (1992)

State

Telephone

Statistical

Cook (1988)

Federal

EPA

Case Study

Crain & McCormick (1984)

State

Electric, Gas Statistical
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Table 3-Continued

Study

Government

Industry

Method of S

Crew, Kleindorfer &
Schlenger (1987)

State

Water

Statistical

Delorme, Kamerschen &
Thompson (1992)

State

Electric

Statistical

Denning & Mead (1990)

State

Electric

Statistical

Eckert (1973)

Local

Taxi Cabs

Quantitative

Eckert (1981)

Federal

ICC, CAB,
FCC

Quantitative

Faith, Leavens & Tollison (1982)

Federal

FTC

Statistical

Fenn & Veljanowski (1988)

Other

Factory
Safety

Statistical

Garvey (1993)

Federal

FERC

Case Study

Gildea (1990)

Federal

FOMC

Statistical

Gormley (1979)

Federal

FCC

Quantitative

Gormley (1983)

State

Utility

Statistical

Hagerman & Ratchford (1978)

State

Electric

Statistical

Harris & Navarro (1983)

State

Electric

Statistical

Havrilesky & Schweitzer (1990)

Federal

FOMC

Statistical

Hedge & Jallow (1990)

Federal

OSM

Statistical

Hickel (1984)

State

Electric

Quantitative

Jackson (1969)

State

Electric

Statistical
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Table 3-Continued

Study

Government

Industry

Method of Study

Higgins & McChesney (1987)

Federal

FTC

Statistical

Joskow (1972)

State

Utility

Statistical

Joskow (1974)

State

Electric

Case Study

Telephone

Statistical

Kasserman, Mayo & Pacey (1993) State
Krasnow & Longley (1973)

Federal

FCC

Case Study

Langbein & Wilson (1994)

Local

Airport
Concessions

Quantitative

Makkai & Braithwaite (1992)

Other

Nursing
Homes

Statistical

Mann & Primeaux (1983)

State

Electric

Statistical

Mazmanian & Sabatier (1980)

Local

Land Use

Statistical

Miles & Bhambri (1987)

State

Insurance

Quantitative

Moe (1982)

Federal

FTC, NLRB, Statistical
SEC

Navarro (1982)

State

Utility

Statistical

Noll & Smart (1991)

State

Telephone

Case Study

Paul & Schoening (1991)

State

Electric

Statistical

Phillips & Zecher (1981)

Federal

SEC

Case Study

Primeaux, Filer, Herron &
Hollas (1984)

State

Electric

Statistical

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75
Table 3-Continued

Study

Government

Industry

Quirk (1981)

Federal

CAB, FDA, Quantitative
FTC, NHTA

Schmandt, Williams &
Wilson (1989)

State

Telephone

Case Study

Stigler & Friedland (1962)

State

Electric

Statistical

Teske (1990)

State

Telephone

Statistical

Weingast & Moran (1983)

Federal

FTC

Statistical

Wenders (1986)

State

Electric

Quantitative

West (1988)

Federal

CPSC, EPA, Quantitative
FAA, FCC,
FDA, NHTSA,
OSHA, SEC

Method of Study

Committee (FOMC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal
Power Commission (FPC), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), National Highway
Traffic

Safety Administration

(NHTSA),

National

Highway Transportation

Administration (NHTA), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), Office of Surface Mining (OSM), and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). For all other levels, this information specifies the industry being regulated.
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For purposes of this analysis, the "method of study" was derived using three
categories: (1) Statistical—studies using regression analysis with variables subject to
statistical tests of significance; (2) Quantitative—studies using quantitative analysis
other than those incorporating statistical tests of significance;1 and (3) Case Studystudies using qualitative research methods.
A review of Table 3 indicates that statistical studies of federal or state
agencies have been predominant. This is made clearer in Table 4, which aggregates
the information presented in Table 3.
All but one of the 28 state agency studies referenced in Table 4 deal with
utilities of various types (16 electric, 5 telephone, 2 gas, 1 water, and 4 generic).
At the federal level, there are eight studies that include the Federal Trade
Commission, five include the Federal Communications Commission, and three
include the Securities and Exchange Commission. Seventeen other federal agencies
are included in one or two studies.

Types of Variables

A review of the literature suggests that the variables impacting regulatory
decision-making can be arranged into nine categories or themes.

The first three

incorporate variables directly associated with the commissioners or their selection

1 For example, Hickel (1984) is classified as a quantitative study because it
analyzed trends in electric rates for customer classes relative to the costs to serve
those classes, but did not attempt to determine whether the observed differences were
statistically significant.
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Table 4
Types of Research Studies

Government Level

Statistical

Quantitative Case Study

Total

State

20

3

5

28

Federal

12

5

5

22

Local

1

2

0

3

Other

3

0

0

3

Total

36

10

10

56

The first category is whether the regulatory commission is elected or appointed. The
second category comprises elements in the commissioners’ experience and
background, including matters such as education, previous jobs held, and political
party affiliation. The third category includes other variables directly related to the
commissioners, such as term of office, compensation, number of commissioners,
budget, and funding sources.
The fourth category includes variables directly associated with the activity of
interest groups before the commission. For example, a variable that measures the
participation of an advocate for residential consumers would be classified in this
category. The fifth category includes variables intended to serve as proxies for the
activity, or at least potential activity, of interest groups.

This category includes

variables such as per capita income, proportion of the population in urban areas,
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unemployment rate, value added per manufacturing firm, and proportion of
residential to industrial customers.
The sixth and seventh categories reflect principal-agent considerations. The
sixth category includes variables intended to measure the influence of the state
legislature on a state regulatory agency or of the U.S. Congress on a federal agency.
Similarly, the seventh category includes those variables that measure the impact of
the governor on a state agency or the President on a federal agency. The eighth
category consists of variables that gauge the impact of the commission’s staff upon
the commissioners’ decision. Finally, the ninth category incorporates case specific
variables that are relevant only to a specific decision or type of decision and are not
generalizable to a more generic theory of regulation. Examples include the size of
a utility’s rate base, the proportion of nuclear power in a utility’s generating capacity
mix, a utility’s capital structure, average access loop costs, and the number of
customers per mile of system pipeline.
Table 5 indicates which research studies incorporated each type of variable,
as well as the basic design of the study and significance of the results.2 In this table,
the code "S" indicates that variables in this category were found to be statistically
significant.

The code "N" indicates that the variables were not statistically

significant. The code "SN" indicates that either: (a) multiple variables were used

2 This table does not include the following studies since their research questions
are not suited to this form of analysis: Stigler and Friedland (1962), Jackson (1969),
Eckert (1973), Denning and Mead (1990), and Langbein and Wilson (1994).
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Table 5
Regulatory Research Results

Study

Altrogge &
Shughart (1984)
Amacher, Higgins,
Shughart & Tollison
(1985)
Anderson (1981)

........................................

--

—

--

—

S

--

—

S N

S

............................

C

Anderson &
Glazer (1984)

—

--

Atkinson &
Nowell (1994)

S

-

N

-

C

-

C

Barkovich (1989)

--

C
SN

N

............................

C

Barton (1979)
Baumann, Iledare,
Mesyanzhinov &
Pulsipher (1994)

SN
—

—

—

—

Boucher (1991)

S

SN

Breyer & MacAvoy
(1974)

—

—

Caudill, Im
& Kaserman (1993)

-

-

Q

N

S

Chubb (1983)......................................................................
Coate, Higgins &
McChesney (1990)

SN

C
S

C
-

S

C
S

S
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Table 5-Continued

Study

1

Cohen (1992)

N

2

3

4

N

5

-

Cook (1988)

C

Crain & McCormick SN
(1984)

...........................

SN

N

Eckert (1981)

...........................

Q

SN

7

SN

8

SN

9

S

N

C

...........................

Crew, Kleindorfer
& Schlenger (1987)
Delorme, Kamerschen & Thompson
(1992)

6

SN

...........................

SN

SN

...........................

SN

SN

...........................

S

...........................

Faith, Leavens
Tollison (1982)

SN

...........................

Fenn & Veljanowski —
(1988)

...........................

S

c

Garvey (1993)
Gildea (1990)

SN

-

-

Gormley (1979)

Q

...........................

Gormley (1983)

N

SN

-

Hagerman &
Ratchford (1978)

N

SN

-

Harris & Navarro
(1983)

N

N

SN

SN

SN

-

SN
...........................

...........................

SN
SN

S
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Table 5--Continued

Study

1

2

3

4

5

Havrilesky &
Schweitzer (1990)

SN

Hedge & Jallow
(1990)

...........................

6

Q

SN

Joskow (1972)

s

Joskow (1974)

c
...........................

Mann & Primeaux
(1983)

SN

Mazmanian &
Sabatier (1980)

S

Miles & Bhambri
(1987)

Q

SN

-

-

SN

...........................

SN

...........................

S

S

-

S

N

c

-

c

-

-

-

s

s

...........................

...........................

s

Moe (1982)
Navarro (1982)

SN

c

Krasnow & Longley —
(1973)
SN

9

„

Higgins &
McChesney (1987)

Makkai & Braithwaite (1992)

8

...........................

Hickel (1984)

Kasserman, Mayo & S
Pacey (1993)

7

N

N

SN

-

...........................

N
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Table 5-Continued

Study

Noll & Smart
(1991)

1

2

—

3

4

5

6

7

8

—

C

—

—

—

--

Paul & Schoening
(1991)

S

—

—

—

S

--

—

Phillips &
Zecher (1981)

~

~

—

c

--

—

—

Primeaux, Filer,
Herron & Hollas
(1984)

s

s

—

—

Quirk (1981)

—

Q

—

—

—

—

—

—

Schmandt, Williams
& Wilson (1989)

—

—

—

—

—

C

c

—

Teske (1990)

N

—

SN

—

SN

s

—

--

Weingast & Moran
(1983)

—

—

—

—

—

s

—

Wenders (1986)

—

—

—

Q

—

—

—

—

West (1988)

—

Q

—

—

—

—

~

—

9

S

--

s

in a category and some were significant while others were not, or (b) multiple
analyses were conducted using different data and the variable was significant in some
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scenarios but not in others.3 The code "Q" indicates that the variable was included
in a quantitative study that did not incorporate a statistical decision-making model.
The code "C" indicates that the variable was identified through a case study. The
nine numbered categories are as follows: (1) method of selection, (2) background of
commissioners, (3) other variables directly associated with the commission, (4)
variables directly measuring the activity of interest groups, (5) proxy variables for
interest groups, (6) State Legislature or Congress, (7) Governor or President, (8)
commission staff, and (9) case specific variables.
Although Table 5 consolidates a substantial amount of information regarding
the results of research into regulatory decision-making, it still does not provide a
clear picture of these results. Accordingly, the information in Table 5 was further
consolidated by determining the number of times that a particular coding occurred in
each of the nine categories. This information is presented in Table 6.
Table 6 suggests a number of observations regarding the results of published
research.

First, it indicates the extent to which studies have focused on specific

categories of variables.

Leaving aside the case specific variables, which far

outnumber any other category, all remaining categories have been studied
approximately the same number of times except for the Governor/President and other
commission variables. It is surprising that little research has been performed on the
impact of the chief of the executive branch of government on the performance of

3 However, a variable was coded as "S" if it was significant in more than 80
percent of the cases and as "N" if it was not significant in more than 80 percent.
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Table 6
Summary o f Regulatory Research Results

Issue Category

S

SN

N

Q

c

Total

Method of Selection

5

2

7

0

0

14

Commissioners’ Background

0

3

1

5

2

11

Other Commission Variables

1

4

3

0

0

8

Interest Groups

1

1

0

2

6

10

Interest Group Proxies

2

9

2

0

0

13

Legislature/Congress

4

4

0

0

3

11

Governor/President

1

2

0

0

2

5

Staff

5

1

0

0

6

12

Case Specific Variables

11

10

3

1

0

25

regulatory agencies which are commonly housed within that branch.
Second, Table 6 indicates that different types of studies tend to be employed
to analyze various themes.

Thus, the impact of elected versus appointed

commissioners, other commission variables, interest group proxies, and case specific
variables have been almost exclusively examined with statistical techniques. On the
other hand, case studies have tended to focus most on direct interest group
involvement and the commission staff, and to a lesser extent on the legislative branch
and the executive branch. Finally, although the background of commissioners has
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Table 7
Summary o f Statistical Regulatory Research

Issue Category

S

SN

N

Total

Success

Method of Selection

5

2

7

14

50%

Commissioners’ Background

0

3

1

4

75%

Other Commission Variables

1

4

3

8

63 %

Interest Groups

1

1

0

2

100%

Interest Group Proxies

2

9

2

13

85%

Legislature/Congress

4

4

0

8

100%

Governor/President

1

2

0

3

100%

Staff

5

1

0

6

100%

Case Specific Variables

11

10

3

25

88%

been studied about as often as other variable classes, there have been relatively few
attempts to incorporate this factor into decision-making models, perhaps because it
would often be relatively difficult to quantify.
Third, the data in Table 6 suggest how successful certain variables have been
in accounting for the decision-making of regulatory agencies. This is made clearer
in Table 7, which extracts from the prior table only that information associated with
research which produced model variables that were tested for statistical significance.
The column labeled "Success" indicates the percentage of occurrences in which
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research found a particular category of variables to be significant in some or all of
the cases (i.e., the number of "S" plus "SN" results divided by the total).
A review of Table 7 indicates a wide divergence in the proportion of studies
which have found various classes of variables to be significant.

Except for case

specific variables, the method of selecting commissioners has been the most
commonly studied variable; yet, it was found to be significant only 50 percent of the
time. The variables most likely to be found significant were those associated with
interest groups, the legislature, the governor, and the commission staff, but these
were among the less commonly studied areas.
The information in Tables 6 and 7 consolidates findings from studies of
regulatory agencies at all levels of government. Because the current research focuses
on the decision-making process at state public utility commissions, prior studies of
those agencies would be more relevant. Table 8 provides a summary of research
results limited to studies of state public utility commissions.
A review of Table 8 suggests several considerations that were not evident in
the prior tables. First, it highlights the primary role that the method of commissioner
selection has played in prior research. Thirteen of the 17 statistical studies included
in the derivation of Table 8 included method of selection as an independent variable.
The attention paid to this variable was not obvious in the prior analysis because a
substantial amount of that data was derived from studies of federal commissions.
There are no elected federal regulatory commissions; all are appointed.
Second, the background of commissioners is the least studied issue category
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Table 8
Results of State Public Utility Commission Research

Issue Category

S

SN

N

Q

C

Total

Method of Selection

4

2

7

0

0

13

Commissioners’ Background

0

0

1

0

0

1

Other Commission Variables

0

4

3

0

0

7

Interest Groups

1

1

0

2

3

7

Interest Group Proxies

2

7

1

0

0

10

Legislature

2

1

0

0

1

4

Governor

0

1

0

0

1

2

Staff

3

1

0

0

2

6

Case Specific Variables

7

5

3

0

0

15

in Table 8. A comparison with Table 6 indicates that there were eleven studies that
included this issue, but only one involved state public utility commissions. Since
studies of state commissions comprise half of all studies included in Table 6, this
suggests that, when compared to studies of other agencies, relatively little attention
has been given to the background of state utility commissioners.
Third, Table 8 tends to confirm some observations from the prior tables.
Little attention has been given to the impact of the head of the executive branch (the
governor in this case). The role of interest groups has been extensively studied, but
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statistical research has focused on proxies for these groups, while other types of
studies have been used to examine the direct role that they play in the regulatory
process. Finally case specific variables continue to predominate, although not to the
extent that was apparent in the prior tables.

Summary

This chapter has categorized the results of the empirical research discussed in
Chapter III.

The insights obtained from this research were combined with the

predictions derived from the theories of regulation to derive a methodology for use
in the present study. That research design is discussed in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER V

RESEARCH DESIGN

Most of the prior empirical studies have been designed to test one or more
aspects of the theories of regulation discussed earlier. The purpose of the research
design presented in this chapter is to continue this trend by examining the impact of
variables suggested by the theories on the decisions made by state utility regulatory
commissions.

This study is intended to provide an empirical test of regulatory

decision-making, both on an historical and a comparative basis. In doing so, the
primary focus will be on which characteristics of these competing theories of
regulation are borne out through systematic and quantifiable analysis of the data.
Since each model focuses on a particular aspect of regulatory decision-making and
is thus incomplete, it is anticipated that variables derived from multiple models will
be required to develop a more comprehensive theory. The aim is not to create a new
competing theory, but rather to combine the most suitable elements from the existing
theories into a more complete formulation.
This research focuses on the decision-making process used by state regulatory
commissions in setting utility rates. The subject has several advantages that make it
suitable for study: (a) utility rate regulation is ubiquitous, being practiced in all 50
states; (b) utility ratemaking takes place within a well-defined process that is
thoroughly documented; (c) information on the process and participants is publicly
89
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available; and (d) the parties make known their interests during the process.

In

general, the interests of the utility and its customers are directly opposed; the utility
seeks higher rates, while consumers seek lower rates.
The research design incorporates a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis
of decisions by twelve state utility regulatory commissions over the period 1974
through 1993. This period post-dates the Arab Oil Embargo in late 1973. That event
had a significant impact on participants in energy-related fields, and decision-making
processes of commissioners after the embargo could be expected to be different from
those before (Barkovich, 1989).

However, the period is long enough to encompass

all phases of the business cycle and to include periods of moderate and high inflation.
The sample in the study was drawn using pooled cross-sectional data. For
each of the years in the study period, one rate case order was selected using a
random number generator for each of the twelve states in the sample. A rate case
is defined as a formal commission proceeding to determine a public utility’s retail
rates, charges, or tariffs. Commissions rarely provide a simple positive or negative
decision on a rate increase request. Instead, each such request is normally divided
into multiple independent elements, known as issues, and the commission reaches a
decision on each separate issue.

An issue is defined as an independent point of

dispute between two or more parties which the commission resolves in its order.
Each order in the sample was analyzed using the technique of content analysis to
determine: (a) the issues in dispute, (b) the position taken by various participants on
each issue, and (c) the decision reached by the commission on each issue. One issue
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from each case was selected using a random number generator, providing a total
sample size of 240 (12 states x 20 years).
The twelve states included in the sample are California, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Washington. These states are geographically diverse and include states
with elected and appointed commissions in approximately the same proportion as the
national average.
Typically studies of regulatory agencies divide commissioners into two
categories: elected and appointed. Twelve1 of the 50 states chose commissioners
by direct popular election during all or part of the study period. In two other states
(South Carolina and Virginia), commissioners were elected by the legislature.

In

prior studies these have sometimes been classified as elected commissions (Berry,
1979; Mann and Primeaux, 1983) and sometimes as appointed commissions (Crain
and McCormick, 1984). Many other studies do not specify their definition. To
avoid this ambiguity, states in this study were classified into three categories:
appointed, directly elected, and elected by the legislature.
The data from the sample were analyzed to determine the functional
relationship between the commission’s decision regarding the utility’s position on an
issue and independent variables derived from the theories of regulation. Because the

1 Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee. In addition,
New Mexico and Texas have one elected and one or two (in the case of Texas)
appointed commissions overseeing utility regulation.
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dependent variable is essentially dichotomous, the standard linear regression method
would not be appropriate.

Instead, the logit form of the probability model was

utilized in the analysis (Stiefel, 1990).

Definition of the Model

The hypothesized function for regulatory decisions is:
COMDEC =

f (LEG, ADM, ELEC, ELLG, CPI, UNEM, PDEN, MANU,
RES, PROX, GRAD, BIZ, BORG, GOV, UTIL, CPOL,
CUTL, CBIZ, CRES, CLAW, CTIM, CAGE, CSTF, SPRO,
SCON).

In this equation, COMDEC, the dependent variable, has a value of 1 if the
commission adopts the utility’s position on an issue, 0 if it rejects the position, and
0.5 if it partially accepts and partially rejects the position. Because the logit model
requires a binary dependent variable, the sample selection process excluded cases
where COMDEC had a value of 0.5.

Independent Variables

External Variables

LEG is the proportion of the state’s legislature that is Democratic.

This

variable was calculated by determining the proportion for each house of the
legislature and then averaging the two.

The public choice model posits a
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principal/agent relationship between legislators and commissioners. The legislature
is expected to have an impact on a commission’s decisions because it controls the
agency’s budget. Based on the premise that Democratic legislators are more likely
to favor the interests of consumers, the public choice model and prior research
suggest a negative coefficient for this variable. Teske (1990) found that public utility
commissions in states where the legislature was under Republican control were
significantly more likely to favor the interests of communications utilities rather than
consumers. At the federal level, Coate, Higgins, and McChesney (1990) found that
Congressional oversight had a significant impact on the decisions of the Federal
Trade Commission. Similarly, Derthick and Quirk (1985) found that the Federal
Communications Commission’s decision to become more aggressive was prompted
in large part by Congressional oversight.

Weingast and Moran (1983) found a

significant relationship between Congressional liberal support scores as measured by
the Americans for Democratic Action and consumer protection cases instituted by the
Federal Trade Commission. Miles and Bhambri (1983) found that state insurance
commissioners considered the state legislature to be the most important strategic
interest group.

Kaserman, Mayo and Pacey (1993) found that a regulatory

commission was significantly more likely to deregulate long-distance telephone
service if pro-deregulation bills had previously been enacted by the legislature.
The variable ADM is intended to measure the governor’s impact on the
regulatory commission’s decision. It has a value of 1 if the governor is a Democrat
and 0 if Republican. As in the case of the legislature, the public choice model posits
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a principal/agent relationship between the governor and the commission. A negative
coefficient is also expected for this variable based on the premise that Democratic
governors are more likely to favor the interests of consumers.

Relatively little

research has been done on the relationship between the governor and a state
commission, but Moe (1982) analyzed three federal agencies and found that changes
in the presidential administration had a significant effect on their decision-making.
Chubb’s (1983) case studies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal
Energy Administration (and its successor the Economic Regulatory Administration)
suggested that the President had a significant effect on these agencies.
ELEC is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the commission is chosen by
direct popular election and 0 otherwise. ELLG is a dummy variable with a value of
1 if the commission is elected by the state legislature and 0 otherwise. The public
choice model suggests a negative coefficient for ELEC. The expected sign for the
ELLG variable is unclear in part because it has been included with either elected or
appointed commissions in previous studies. Prior research has not reached consistent
conclusions regarding the impact of elected commissions. As discussed in Chapter
IV, of the fourteen studies using this variable, five found the method of commissioner
selection to be significant, seven others found it not significant, one other study
concluded that elected commissions made a significant difference for electric rates but
not for gas rates, and the remaining study indicated that elected commissions had a
significant effect on some rates but not on others.
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Proxy Variables for Interest Groups

CPI is the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index during the 12month period preceding the order.

The public choice model predicts a negative

coefficient for this variable. Peltzman (1976) argued that regulators would act in a
countercyclical manner~not raising prices rapidly during periods of increased demand
and not reducing prices significantly during periods of excess supply. Evans and
Garber (1988) reached a similar conclusion regarding the rate of return authorized
by regulators. Amacher et al. (1985) found that enforcement actions by the Federal
Trade Commission followed this countercyclical pattern. Navarro (1985) concluded
that during periods of upward inflationary pressures, commissions did not, or could
not, raise electricity prices fast enough to match the rise in the utility’s energy and
capital costs.
UNEM is the percentage unemployment rate in the state. As discussed with
the previous variable, the public choice model suggests that regulation will follow a
countercyclical trend and thus predicts a negative coefficient for this variable.
PDEN is the population density per square mile. The public choice model
argues that the impact of interest groups will depend upon the degree to which they
can organize effectively. This is especially important for interests that are dispersed
and have a relatively small stake per individual in the outcome, such as residential
consumers. In a state with a high population density it should be easier to organize
consumers into effective interest groups. Thus the public choice model suggests a
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negative coefficient for this variable because a high population density should be
more favorable to consumers and less so to utilities.
MANU is the proportion of gross state product that is derived from
manufacturing. Because manufacturing tends to be dominated by large firms more
than other forms of economic activity, a predominance of manufacturing in the state’s
economy implies that business interests should be better organized.2 Thus the public
choice model suggests a negative coefficient for this variable, i.e., a higher
proportion of manufacturing is favorable to business consumers and thus less
favorable to utility interests. This specific variable has not been tested before, but
similar variables have been found to be significant. Primeaux, Filer, Herron and
Hollas (1984) found that manufacturing value added per firm was a significant
variable affecting the hostility of commissions to electric competition. Teske (1990)
found that the number of Fortune Service 450 companies headquartered in a state had
a significant effect on the commission’s policies regarding telecommunications pricing
and competition.

Intervenor Variables

The variables RES, PROX, GRAD, BIZ, BORG, GOV, and UTIL measure
the degree of formal opposition or support for the utility’s position by parties

2 In 1989, U.S. manufacturing businesses averaged $2.66 million contribution
toward gross state product, while other goods producing businesses averaged $0.73
million and service businesses averaged $0.49 million (Kane, 1992).
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participating in the rate case.

The public choice model holds that a regulatory

agency’s decisions are responsive to the pressures placed upon it by organized interest
groups.

Each of these variables is measured by the net number of customers or

organizations of a specified class opposed to the utility’s position (i.e., the number
opposed minus the number in favor of the utility’s position).

Conceptually this

netting process may be questionable since it is unclear that a commission would view
having ten parties in favor and nine opposed to a position equivalent to having one
in favor and none opposed. However, in practice, netting occurs in less than onequarter of one percent of the data, so this concern should have no appreciable impact
on the study. Of course, some process was necessary to deal with those infrequent
occasions where this situation did occur.
RES is the net number of individual residential customers opposed to the
utility’s position on an issue. PROX is the net number of proxy advocates opposed
to the utility’s position. A proxy advocate is defined as a government agency that
represents the interests of residential customers in a rate case. In most cases, this
will be the state Attorney General or Consumer Counsel (Gormley, 1983). GRAD
is the net number of grass roots advocates that oppose the utility’s position. A grass
roots advocate is defined as a private non-government organization that promotes the
interests of residential customers in a rate case. BIZ is the net number of individual
commercial or industrial customers opposed to the utility’s position. BORG is the
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net number of business organizations opposed to the utility’s position.3 GOV is the
net number of government organizations (other than proxy advocates) opposed to the
utility’s position. UTIL is the net number of utilities, other than the one that is the
applicant in the rate case, that oppose the applicant utility’s position.
One purpose of this research is to measure the affect that these parties have
on the commission’s decision. The public choice model predicts negative coefficients
for each of these variables, but also suggests that better organized participants will
have greater impact than those who are unorganized.

Prior statistical research has

generally utilized proxies for the activity of interest groups in utility cases.

As

discussed in Chapter IV, efforts to measure directly the impact of interest groups
have been limited to case studies, except for two statistical studies.

Crew,

Kleindorfer, and Schlenger (1987) found that, in water utility rate cases, the number
of intervening parties did not have a statistically significant impact on the rate
increase authorized by the commission, but the amount spent by those parties had a
significant impact for large water companies but not for small ones. Caudill, Im, and
Kaserman (1994) found that an intervenor’s position had a significant impact upon
a commission’s rate of return determination.
The public choice model also suggests that larger, better-organized interests

3 An example of such a business organization is the Association of Businesses
Advocating Tariff Equity, commonly known by its acronym ABATE. ABATE has
30 members including: Chrysler, Dow Corning, Ford Motor Company, General
Motors, National Steel, Guardian Industries, Martin Marietta, Monsanto, Steelcase,
and Warner-Lambert. Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity (1994).
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should have greater impact than smaller, less-organized ones. Thus, the coefficient
of BORG would be expected to be larger than BIZ. Similarly, the coefficient for
GRAD would be expected to be larger than for RES. Gormley (1983) found that
proxy advocates have significantly greater resources than grass roots advocates, so
that the coefficient for PROX would be expected to be larger than for GRAD. Crew,
Kleindorfer and Schlenger (1987) found that, in large (but not small) water utility rate
cases, the amount spent by intervening parties had a significant impact, providing
some support for the argument that the regulatory process favors larger, wellorganized participants.

Commissioner Background Variables

CPOL, CUTL, CBIZ, CRES, CLAW, CTIM, CAGE, and CSTF are
variables that measure certain characteristics of the commissioners who participate
in the commission’s final rate order. The first five are derived from the public spirit
model, which holds that the values of decision-makers play a major role in
determining the nature of their decision, a position that is supported by several
studies (Quirk, 1981; Miles and Bhambri, 1987; West, 1988; Cook, 1988;
Barkovich, 1989; Gildea, 1990; Havrilesky and Schweitzer, 1990; Makkai and
Braithwaite, 1992).
The research design was limited by the fact that values of decision-makers are
not normally directly observable.

Since the study covers a twenty-year period,

attempts to measure values of commissioners throughout that period by an instrument
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such as a survey would be at least impractical, if not impossible. Instead, proxy
measures were utilized to evaluate various characteristics of commissioners’
backgrounds that could logically affect the development of their values.
CPOL measures the proportion of commissioners participating in the decision
who are Democratic.

For this and other variables, commissioners abstaining or

dissenting from the decision were not included in calculating the proportion. The
public spirit model and prior research suggests a negative coefficient for this variable.
Gormley (1979) found that, at the Federal Communications Commission, Republican
commissioners were more likely than Democratic commissioners to support the
position of the regulated broadcasting industry. Quirk (1981) found that Democratic
federal regulatory officials were significantly more likely to have attitudes
antagonistic to the regulated industry than Republican officials. Miles and Bhambri
(1983) found that Democratic state insurance commissioners were more likely to
pursue a public interest philosophy while Republicans were more closely aligned with
the regulated industry status quo.
CUTL measures the proportion of commissioners participating in the decision
with prior experience working for a utility. A positive coefficient for this variable
would be expected, but prior research has not produced clear results.

Gormley

(1979) found that, at the Federal Communications Commission, commissioners who
had previously worked for broadcasters were more likely than other commissioners
to support the broadcasting industry’s position. However, Gormley (1983) found that
public utility regulators who formerly worked for a utility company did not differ
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significantly from other regulators in their policy preferences. Quirk (1981) found
some limited evidence that, for federal regulatory officials, direct employment in the
regulated industry was associated with pro-industry attitudes. Miles and Bhambri
(1983) found that prior experience working for an insurance company had no impact
on the attitudes of state insurance commissioners.
CBIZ measures the proportion of commissioners who have business
experience. The public spirit model suggests that this variable could be significant,
but is ambiguous regarding its sign since a business orientation could favor or oppose
the utility position depending upon the details of a particular issue. This specific
variable has not been used before, but prior studies have found that business interests
can have a significant impact (Primeaux, Filer, Herron, and Hollas, 1984; and Teske,
1990).
CRES is the proportion of commissioners who have prior experience
representing the interests of residential consumers.

Because residential interests

would normally be opposed to utility interests, the public spirit model suggests a
negative coefficient for this variable, but it has not been used in prior studies.
CLAW measures the proportion of commissioners participating in the decision
who are lawyers. Based on a survey of commissioners, Gormley (1983) concluded
that lawyers are more likely to be sympathetic to underrepresented interests, such as
consumers in general, residential consumers, the poor, and environmental interests.
Thus, a negative coefficient is predicted for this variable.
CTIM is the average length of time that commissioners participating in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

decision have been on the commission. This variable is derived from the capture
model, which holds that regulatory agencies are "captured" by the regulated industry
in the sense that the regulators come to identify their interests with those of the
regulated entities. Assuming that this capture occurs over time, the degree of capture
should increase with one’s length of time on the commission. Accordingly, a positive
coefficient is suggested.
CAGE is the average age of commissioners participating in the decision. This
variable is a proxy intended to measure the impact of inducements related to future
jobs that regulated utilities could offer commissioners. This factor, known as the
"revolving door", is based on the observation that regulators often take jobs with
firms that they formerly regulated. In a study of four federal agencies, Eckert (1981)
found that 51 % of former commissioners obtained related jobs in the private sector.
Although not necessarily required by the public choice model, this variable is
consistent with it, since that model posits that decision-makers act in their own
interests, which could include prospects for future employment.
In this study, a direct measure of the number of commissioners who have
taken jobs with a regulated utility would not be meaningful since many of the
commissioners participating in decisions included in this study are still on the
commission. In addition, it would be very difficult to track the post-commission
employment history of all commissioners participating in 240 cases over the twentyyear span of this study.
selected as a proxy.

Consequently, the average age of commissioners was
The conceptual basis for this proxy is that younger
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commissioners, who are in the early stages of their careers, are more likely to be
concerned about their prospects for future advancement than older commissioners,
who are at or near the end of their careers. The younger the commissioner, the
greater is the present value of any future private sector employment.
CSTF is the proportion of commissioners who were members of the
commission’s staff prior to their appointment (or election) to the commission. As
previously discussed, under the capture model, members of a regulatory agency are
gradually co-opted by the regulated entities.

Hence, former commission staff

members are more likely to favor regulated companies than commissioners who are
new to the process. Chubb (1983) conducted case studies of three federal regulatory
agencies and found that staff members generally favored the regulated industries.
Hence, a positive coefficient is suggested for this variable.

Staff Variables

SPRO is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the commission staff supports
the utility’s position and 0 otherwise. SCON is a dummy variable with a value of 1
if the commission staff opposes the utility’s position and 0 otherwise. As discussed
in Chapter IV, the role of public utility commission staffs has not been widely
studied, but the available research has concluded that the staff has a major impact on
the commission’s decision (Anderson, 1981; Gormley, 1983; Barkovich, 1989;
Cohen, 1992; Caudill, Im, and Kaserman, 1993; Kaserman, Mayo, and Pacey,
1993). The public spirit model and prior research predicts a positive coefficient for
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SPRO and a negative coefficient for SCON.
Table 9 summarizes the variables used in the research, the theory underlying
each, and the expected sign of the coefficient. Table 10 indicates the source of data
for each variable.

Table 9
Summary of Independent Variables

Variable

Definition

Theory

Sign

LEG

Democrats in the Legislature

Public Choice

Negative

ADM

Party of the Governor

Public Choice

Negative

ELEC

Elected Commission

Public Choice

Negative

ELLG

Elected by Legislature

Public Choice

Unclear

CPI

Change in C. P. I.

Public Choice

Negative

UNEM

Unemployment Rate

Public Choice

Negative

PDEN

Population Density

Public Choice

Negative

MANU

Manufacturing Proportion of
Gross State Produce

Public Choice

Negative

RES

Residential Customers

Public Choice

Negative

PROX

Proxy Advocate

Public Choice

Negative

GRAD

Grass Roots Advocate

Public Choice

Negative

BIZ

Individual Businesses

Public Choice

Negative

BORG

Business Organizations

Public Choice

Negative
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Table 9--Continued

Variable

Definition

Theory

Sign

GOV

Government Agencies

Public Choice

Negative

UTIL

Other Utilities

Public Choice

Negative

CPOL

Comm. Political Party

Public Spirit

Negative

CUTL

Comm. Worked for Utility

Public Spirit

Positive

CBIZ

Comm. Business Background

Public Spirit

Unclear

CRES

Comm. Residential Interests

Public Spirit

Negative

CLAW

Comm. Lawyers

Public Spirit

Negative

CTIM

Comm. Length of Time

Capture

Positive

CAGE

Commissioners’ Age

Public Choice

Negative

CSTF

Comm. Previously Staff

Capture

Positive

SPRO

Staff Agrees with Utility

Public Spirit

Positive

SCON

Staff Opposes Utility

Public Spirit

Negative

The model employed in this research is a composite derived primarily from
the public choice and public spirit theories of regulation. As such, it recognizes the
impact of both internal and external influences on an agency’s decision-making
process.

Figure 1 presents a conceptual diagram of the process model that

incorporates these diverse influences. Although this model incorporates elements of
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Table 10
Data Sources

Variable

Source of Data

LEG

Council of State Legislators

ADM

Council of State Legislators

ELEC

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

ELLG

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

CPI

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

UNEM

Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

PDEN

Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

MANU

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

RES

Analysis of Commission Decisions

PROX

Analysis of Commission Decisions

GRAD

Analysis of Commission Decisions

BIZ

Analysis of Commission Decisions

BORG

Analysis of Commission Decisions

GOV

Analysis of Commission Decisions

UTIL

Analysis of Commission Decisions

CPOL

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

CUTL

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

CBIZ

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107
Table 10-Continued

Variable

Source of Data

CRES

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

CLAW

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

CTIM

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

CAGE

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

CSTF

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

SPRO

Analysis of Commission Decisions

SCON

Analysis of Commission Decisions

both the public choice and public spirit model, it enlarges the concepts inherent in
these theories because it focuses on the process by which external and internal factors
combine to establish an agency policy.
In addition to the variables detailed in Tables 9 and 10, which were derived
from the theories of regulation, several variables were used to control for various
factors that might impact the study results. First, each issue was classified into one
of five categories: (1) rate base, which is an issue involving the appropriate amount
of capitalized plant on which the utility is allowed to earn a return; (2) rate of return,
which is an issue involving the utility’s capital structure or the cost of any elements
of the capital structure; (3) operating income, which is any issue involved in
determining the utility’s net income, other than rate base or rate of return issues; (4)
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SELECTION PROCESS

GOVERNOR

UTILITY

LEGISLATURE

COMMISSIONERS

INTEREST
GROUPS

Political Party
Time in Office
Job Expectations
Job Experience
Education
COMMISSION STAFF

Figure 1.

Process Model of Agency Decision-making.

(4) rate design, which is an issue involving the allocation of costs among customer
classes; and (5) other.

Certain types of issues could be more important to some

stakeholders than others.

For example, a disallowance of a rate base cost (issue

category one) causes an immediate accounting loss to the utility of the full amount
of the disallowance, but results in a relatively small immediate reduction in rates to
consumers since the impact of the disallowance is spread over the remaining useful
life of the plant. Evans and Garber (1988) suggest that, because of its high visibility
with customers, regulators will seek to control a utility’s authorized rate of return
(issue category two) rather than its prices. Rate design issues (category four) do not
normally impact the total revenues that the utility receives, but rather the allocation
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of the utility’s costs among its customers. Consequently, these issues are expected
to be more important to customers than to the utility. Four dummy variables were
created, each corresponding to one of the issue categories discussed above.

Summary

The research design, as detailed in this chapter, incorporates a combination
of external variables derived from the public choice model and internal variables
largely derived from the public spirit model. The hypothesis underlying this process
model is that commission decisions are derived through an administrative process that
consolidates both external and internal factors and that a theory focusing on only one
aspect will be incomplete. The next chapter explains the empirical results that were
obtained from the study of this model.
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CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS

This chapter presents the empirical results of the research. These results will
be discussed in six sections: (1) correlations among the independent variables; (2)
development of the regression equation, including significance of the variables and
of the model as a whole; (3) tests of the model; (4) interpretation of the regression
coefficients; (5) use of additional variables in the model; and (6) development of an
alternative regression equation.

Correlation Between Variables

The dependent variable was analyzed as a function of the independent
variables using the logit form of the regression model (also known as logistic
regression analysis).

The logit model estimates the probability of the event

characterized by the dependent variable occurring using the following equations:
P = exp(Z) / (1 + exp(Z))
Z = A + B(1)X(1) + B(2)X(2) + ... + B(n)X(n).
In these equations, "P" is the probability of the dependent variable event
occurring, "exp(Z)" is the natural logarithm base "e" raised to the "Z" power, "X"
represents the various independent variables, and "B" represents the coefficients of
the independent variables. Whereas the standard regression model calculates the

110
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dependent variable as a linear function of the independent variables, the logit model
calculates the exponent Z as a linear combination of the dependent variables (Norusis,
1990). The logit model is appropriate where the independent variable is dichotomous
(i.e., has a value of either 1 or 0). In these cases, the model is used not to calculate
a specific value for the dependent variable, but rather to estimate the probability that
the variable will be a particular value.
Independent variables should not be highly correlated with each other when
using the logit model. Table 11 provides the correlation coefficients for external,
proxy and intervenor variables. Table 12 provides the coefficients for commissioner
and staff variables. This information suggests that the independent variables are not
highly correlated. More than 60% of the variable pairs have correlation coefficients
with an absolute value less than . 10. However, some of the variable combinations
have correlations sufficiently high that the regression results should be interpreted
carefully.
The highest correlation (.61) is between the percentage o f Democrats in the
legislature (LEG) and the dummy variable for elected commissions (ELEC). This
is not surprising since elected commissions are often viewed as favorable to
residential consumers, a position normally identified with Democratic party policies.
Similarly, the proportion of Democratic commissioners is rather highly correlated
with the percentage of Democrats in the legislature (.46), the political party of the
governor (.39), elected commissions (.38), and commissions elected by the legislature
(.37).
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Table 12
Correlations for Commissioner and Staff Variables

.05

1.0

CUTL

.09

.07

1.0

CBIZ

.04

.00

-.17

1.0

CRES

-.19

.03

-.01

-.16

1.0

CLAW -.03

-.14

-.08

-.54

00
©

1.0

©
1

.27

-.06

-.01

-.30

.16

1.0

.03

.16

-.01

.23

-.19

-.10

.41

1.0

CSTF

-.05

-.12

-.04

.05

.14

-.06

-.22

-.13

1.0

SPRO

-.12

-.17

-.03

-.10

.20

.16

-.11

-.17

.07

1.0

SCON

.03

-.04

-.06

.31

-.12

-.13

.00

.07

-.04

CTIM
CAGE

►
—

CPOL

fc
©

1.0

I*

UTIL

1
00

UTIL CPOL CUTL CBIZ CRES CLAW CTIM CAGE CSTF SPRO SCON

The second highest correlation (.58) is between the variables representing the
positions taken by individual residential customers (RES) and individual business
customers (BIZ). A review of the data suggests that this is anomalous—one data point
contains an outlier for each of the variables.1 None of the other correlations between

1 When calculated without this data point, the correlation coefficient is -.02.
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variables representing positions taken by parties exceeds .19.
Some variable pairs have relatively large negative correlations because they
are mutually exclusive. For example, the SPRO (staff favors the utility’s position)
and SCON (staff opposes the utility’s position) variables have a correlation coefficient
of -.48 for this reason.

Similarly the correlation between the proportion of

commissioners with business backgrounds (CBIZ) and the proportion who are lawyers
(CLAW) is -.54. Although these are not mutually exclusive per se, a law firm was
not considered a business for this study, which limited the amount of overlap.
The only other variable pair with a correlation of .50 or greater is the
proportion of commissioners who are lawyers (CLAW) and the dummy variable for
commissioners elected by the legislature (ELLG). The state in this study that elects
commissioners in this manner has a statutory requirement that commissioners be
lawyers.
Some correlation among independent variables is inevitable in any regression
analysis.

The consequence is that it is difficult to separate the effect of each

independent variable, which usually results in large standard errors for each
parameter estimate.

Regression Results

The coefficients, standard errors, and significance of the independent variables
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are presented in Table 13.2 The constant is -0.9492. The variables SCON (staff
opposed to the utility position) and CSTF (proportion of commissioners previously
on the commission staff) are significant at the .01 level. The variables SPRO (staff
in favor of the utility position), CBIZ (proportion of commissioners with a business
background), and MANU (proportion of gross state product derived from
manufacturing) are significant at the .05 level.3

The model has a chi-square of

107.293 with 25 degrees of freedom and is significant at the .01 level.
A review of Table 13 suggests two observations. The first is the significance
of the commission staff variables. All three variables relating to the staff (CSTF,
SPRO, and SCON) are significant; in fact, they are the three most highly significant
variables in the model. The second observation is that none of the seven variables
relating to the positions taken by outside intervenors is significant.
These observations suggest that in the formal regulatory process, the agency
staff, an internal stakeholder, has greater impact on the final decision than other
participants who are external to the agency.

Tests of the Model

One method of testing the model is to use it to predict the value of the

2 In this and subsequent tables, the * symbol indicates that the variable is
significant at the .05 level and the ** symbol indicates significance at the .01 level.
3 This research adopts the frequently used level of .05 for determining statistical
significance. A level o f . 10 is occasionally adopted, which would have been satisfied
by the variable representing elected commissions (ELEC).
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Table 13
Parameter Estimates

Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

Significance

LEG

1.3969

2.0905

.5040

ADM

-0.1010

0.4493

.8222

ELEC

-1.8173

1.0495

.0833

ELLG

0.4109

1.0887

.7059

-0.0507

0.0535

.3433

UNEM

0.0147

0.0964

.8784

PDEN

-0.0012

0.0013

.3309

MANU

-8.8773

4.2005

.0346 *

RES

-0.0389

0.7792

.9602

PROX

-0.2335

0.3404

.4928

GRAD

0.2941

0.4293

.4933

BIZ

-0.1872

0.1898

.3239

BORG

-0.3106

0.3396

.3604

GOV

-0.2029

0.2463

.4100

UTIL

0.1440

0.1096

.1888

CPOL

0.5229

0.8521

.5395

CUTL

3.6285

2.9458

.2180

CPI
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Table 13—Continued

Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

Significance

CBIZ

2.2944

0.9780

.0190 *

CRES

-0.8691

1.4595

.5515

CLAW

1.3430

0.9512

.1580

CTIM

-0.1535

0.0951

.1066

CAGE

0.0434

0.0366

.2353

CSTF

3.7473

1.3780

.0065 **

SPRO

1.5443

0.6344

.0149 *

SCON

-2.6617

0.4808

.0000 **

dependent variable for a given set of independent variables and then compare that
prediction with the actual observation. Since the logit model returns a probability
that an event will occur, it is necessary to transform that probability into a discrete
variable. Typically, a probability of 50% or greater is treated as a prediction that the
event will occur and a probability of less than 50% is considered a prediction that it
will not occur. This convention is applied here to the data used to derive the model,
which results in the classification shown in Table 14.
Table 14 indicates that, using the 50% convention, the model would have
correctly "predicted" approximately 79% of the cases. The reasonableness of this
result can be judged by comparison with other studies using the logit model. For

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

120
Table 14
Model Predictions Using Input Data

Predicted = 0

Predicted = 1

Percentage

Observed = 0

122

19

86.52%

Observed = 1

32

67

67.68%
78.75%

Overall

example, using a model to estimate the likelihood that a state utility regulatory
commission would implement a specific telecommunications pricing policy, Teske
(1990) found that the model correctly predicted 42 (86%) out of the 49 cases from
which it was derived.

A similar model designed for a specific communications

competition decision was correct in 44 out of 49 cases (90%).

Navarro (1982)

developed a model designed to estimate the probability that regulatory climate at a
state utility commission would be rated unfavorable. This model correctly predicted
74% of the cases from which it was derived. Barton (1979) developed a model of
comparative broadcast licensing decisions by the Federal

Communications

Commission based on that agency’s stated guidelines that correctly predicted 24 of
38 cases (63%).

A model developed by Kaserman, Mayo and Pacey (1993) of

commission decisions to deregulate intrastate long-distance telephone service had 33 %
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false positives and 53% false negatives.4 These models were designed to measure
a specific type of decision. The model used in this study, however, may be applied
to any general rate case decision.
Another approach occasionally used is to determine the increase in percentage
of correct predictions using the model compared to those that could have been
achieved without it.5 Since "0" (the commission rejecting the utility’s position) is
the most common observation, a consistent prediction of that outcome would have
produced 99 errors using the data in this study.

Use of the model produces 51

errors, a reduction in the error rate of 48.5% .6
Although the model can be used to "predict" the commission decision using
the data from which it was derived, a better test would be to see how well the model
predicts data not used in its derivation. Two such tests were conducted.
First, the model was applied to other data from the rate casespreviously
examined.

In developing the model, one issue from each of 240 rate cases was

selected at random. In this test of the model, a different issue from each of these
cases was randomly selected. However, only 215 issues could be used since some
cases involved only a single issue, and in others the commission decision on all but
one issue partially adopted the position of each side. Applying the 50% convention

4 It appears that approximately 60% of the cases were predicted correctly.
5This analysis follows that used by Teske (1990).
6 Teske found error rate reductions of 60 percent for pricing decisions and 68
percent for competitive entry decisions.
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Table 15
Model Predictions With External Data

Predicted = 0

Predicted = 1

Percentage

Observed = 0

103

16

86.55%

Observed = 1

31

65

67.71%
78.14%

Overall

to this data produces the classification shown in Table 15.
A comparison of Table 15 with the previous one suggests that the model
produces approximately the same percentage of correct predictions when applied to
data not used in its derivation as it does for input data. In addition, use of the model
reduces the number of errors from 96 to 47, a reduction in the error rate of 51 %.
While this provides additional confidence in the validity of the model, that confidence
is limited by the fact that the test data is taken from the same sample of states used
to develop the model. It says nothing about the applicability of the model to other
states.
To test this aspect, a new sample of twelve rate cases was taken from states7
not included in the original sample. Six of these cases were from 1977, a time of

7 Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah.
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high inflation when there was considerable public outcry over high utility rates. The
remaining six cases were from 1993, a time of low inflation when public concerns
over utility rates were relatively minor. These cases were analyzed utilizing the same
process that was applied to the original cases.

This produced a total of 199

individual issues. Applying the model to predict the commission decision on each
of these issues gives the results shown in Table 16.
A comparison of Table 16 with the two prior ones indicates that the model has
a higher percentage of correct predictions for states not used to develop the model
than for the original states (83% versus approximately 79%). In addition, the model
reduces the number of errors from 86 to 34, a reduction in the error rate of 60.5 %.
The fact that the model performs this well for other states significantly increases
confidence in its validity.
The results described above were developed by treating a probability of 50%
or greater as a prediction that the event would occur and a probability less than 50%
as a prediction that it would not. This prediction rule ignores much of the data
produced by the model which provides a full range of probability estimates from
100% to 0. Another approach that provides a more complete picture is to group the
data in discrete probability increments. Tables 17 (original model data), 18 (other
data from the original twelve states) and 19 (new data from states not used to derive
the model) present this information using increments of 10%.
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Table 16
Model Predictions for Other States

Predicted = 0

Predicted = 1

Percentage

Observed = 0

95

18

84.07%

Observed = 1

16

70

81.40%

Overall

82.91%

These tables indicate that the number of occurrences generally follow the
predicted probabilities.

When the probabilities are very high or very low, the

number of incorrect predictions is small. At intermediate probabilities, the results
tend to be more evenly split. For example, of the total 97 events with an estimated
probability of 90% or greater, 89 (approximately 92%) were correctly predicted.8
In this range, the model should correctly predict more than 90% of the cases, which
it does. Conversely, in the range where the model should predict between 50 and 60
percent of the cases correctly, there are 21 correct predictions out of 38 cases
(approximately 55 percent).9
These tests of the model suggest that it is effective in predicting the actual

8 This consists of 21 out of 21 from Table 17, 28 out of 30 from Table 18, and
40 out of 46 from Table 19.
9 This consists of 6 out of 11 from Table 17, the same from Table 18, and 9 out
of 16 from Table 19.
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Table 17
Probability Distribution-Original Data

Cases

Occurred

90% to 100%

21

21

0

80% to 90%

20

16

4

70% to 80%

20

15

5

60% to 70%

14

9

5

50% to 60%

11

6

5

40% to 50%

22

8

14

30% to 40%

25

11

14

20% to 30%

18

1

17

10% to 20%

39

10

29

0% to 10%

50

2

48

Probability Range

Did Not Occur

decisions of regulatory agencies and can be generalized beyond the sample data.

Interpretation of the Equation

When using linear regression, the impact upon the dependent variable of a unit
change in an independent variable can be read directly from the regression equation.
The interpretation of the logit model is more complicated because the change in the
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Table 18
Probability Distribution-Other Data

Probability Range

Cases

Occurred

Did Not Occur

90% to 100%

30

28

2

80% to 90%

17

15

2

70% to 80%

13

9

4

60% to 70%

10

7

3

50% to 60%

11

6

5

40% to 50%

19

11

8

30% to 40%

22

5

17

20% to 30%

13

2

11

10% to 20%

29

6

23

0% to 10%

51

7

44

dependent variable resulting from a change in one independent variable depends upon
the specific values of all other independent variables. The most common approach
is to evaluate the impact of a change in one variable when all other variables are at
their means. Under these conditions, the value of the dependent variable is 0.383 (a
38.3% probability that the commission will adopt the utility’s position). Table 20
shows the probabilities when each independent variable is increased or decreased by
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Table 19
Probability Distribution-Other States

Cases

Occurred

90% to 100%

46

40

6

80% to 90%

15

10

5

70% to 80%

6

6

0

60% to 70%

5

5

0

50% to 60%

16

9

40% to 50%

20

4

16

30% to 40%

18

2

16

20% to 30%

1

0

1

10% to 20%

40

8

32

0% to 10%

32

2

30

Probability Range

Did Not Occur

i

7

one standard deviation from its mean. The "For" column means that the variable is
modified in the direction favorable to the utility and "Against" is the opposite. The
column labeled "Change" shows the deviation in the dependent variable from the
mean of 38.3% as a result of a change of one standard deviation in the dependent
variable.
As indicated in Table 20, the variables with the greatest impact, in terms of
the change in the dependent variable resulting from a one standard deviation change
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Table 20
Independent Variable Impacts

Variable

For

Against

Change

LEG

42.8%

34.0%

4.4%

ADM

39.5%

37.2%

1.2%

ELEC

52.0%

26.3%

12.8%

ELLG

41.0%

35.7%

2.6%

CPI

42.5%

34.3%

4.1%

UNEM

39.1%

37.6%

0.8%

PDEN

42.9%

33.9%

4.5%

MANU

50.1%

27.8%

11.2%

RES

38.7%

37.9%

0.4%

PROX

41.7%

35.0%

3.4%

GRAD

42.2%

34.6%

3.8%

BIZ

44.3%

32.6%

5.8%

BORG

42.5%

34.3%

4.1%

GOV

41.6%

35.1%

3.2%

UTIL

44.2%

32.7%

5.8%

CPOL

42.1%

34.6%

3.8%

CUTL

43.8%

33.1%

5.4%
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Table 20—Continued

Variable

For

CBIZ

Against

Change

53.6%

25.1%

14.2%

CRES

41.4%

35.3%

3.0%

CLAW

48.3%

29.9%

9.2%

CTIM

49.1%

28.5%

10.3%

CAGE

44.8%

32.2%

6.3%

CSTF

52.1%

26.1%

13.0%

SPRO

52.5%

25.9%

13.3%

SCON

70.1%

14.1%

28.0%

in the independent variable, are SCON-the staff opposed to the utility’s position
(28.0%), CBIZ-the proportion of commissioners with business backgrounds (14.2%),
SPRO-the staff in favor of the utility’s position (13.3%), C STF-the proportion of
commissioners who had previously been members of the commission’s staff (13.0%),
ELEC -a dummy variable for elected commissions (12.8%), and M ANU-the
proportion of gross state product derived from manufacturing (11.2%). Five of these
six variables are also statistically significant at the .05 level (the exception being
elected commissions).
The approach used above requires some of the variables to assume values that
they cannot possibly have. For example, the SPRO (staff in favor of the utility’s
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position) and SCON (staff opposed to the utility’s position) variables are mutually
exclusive-either may have a value of 1 while the other is 0, or both may have a
value of 0, but both cannot have a value of 1.
In some instances, a more practical way of interpreting the variables is to
solve the equation assuming certain states of nature. For example, the staff position
can be favorable to the utility (SPRO = 1 and SCON = 0), neutral (both SPRO and
SCON = 0), or opposed to the utility (SPRO = 0 and SCON = 1). If all other
variables are at their means, the probabilities of the commission deciding in favor of
the utility are shown in Table 21. This information suggests that, all other things
being equal, the position adopted by the staff has a major impact on the final agency
position.
This approach can also be applied to the method of selecting commissioners.
Because of its strong political content, this is a matter that often attracts public
attention. There are three selection methods used: direct popular election (ELEC
= 1 and ELLG = 0), election by the state legislature (ELEC = 0 and ELLG = 1),
and appointment by the governor (both ELEC and ELLG = 0). Using the model
coefficients and keeping all other variables at their means results in the probabilities
of adopting the utility’s position shown in Table 22. This information suggests that
the impact of the method of selection is not as great as the position adopted by the
agency staff.
Interpretations of this sort are not limited to changes in a single parameter.
Table 23 shows a two-dimensional approach, with the vertical axis being different
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Table 21
Probabilities Based on Staff Position

Staff Position

Probability

Favor Utility

90.4%

Neutral

66.8%

Oppose Utility

12.3%

Table 22
Probabilities Based on Selection Method

Selection Method

Probability

Direct Popular Election

10.5%

Election by Legislature

52.2%

Appointment by Governor

42.0%

methods of selection and the horizontal axis representing different staff positions.
This information tends to confirm the prior conclusion that changes in staff position
have more impact than changes in method of selection, although for a given staff
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Table 23
Probabilities Based on Selection
Method and Staff Position

Staff Favor

Staff Neutral

Staff Oppose

Elected

64.1%

27.6%

2.6%

Legislature Elects

94.3%

78.0%

19.8%

Appointed

91.7%

70.1%

14.1%

position, the method of selection also appears to be important.10

Other Variables

The model discussed above was based on variables derived from the theories
of regulation. However, there are other variables that could affect the dependent
variable.

These variables need to be considered since they could influence the

apparent significance of the independent variables included in the main model. Three
different types of variables were considered in this study.
First, dummy variables were constructed for different years included in the
study. The study period covered 20 years, so there were 19 dummy variables of this
type.

The model was then run using these variables in addition to the original

10 This assumes that the two are independent—an issue that will be discussed in
the next chapter.
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variables. Compared with the original model, the resulting equation had a chi-square
of 28.716 with 19 degrees of freedom.11 It was not significant at the .05 level so
that the alternative model fails to pass the chi-square test and dummy variables for
years need not be included in the model.
Second, dummy variables were constructed for the different types of issues.
As previously discussed, decisions in utility rate cases can be divided into separate
independent issues, which fall into five classes: rate base, rate of return, operating
income, rate design, and other. The model was run using dummy variables for the
first four along with the original variables. Compared with the original model, the
resulting equation had a chi-square of 1.098 with four degrees o f freedom. It was
not significant at the .05 level so that the alternative model fails to pass the chi-square
test and dummy variables for issue classes need not be included in the model.
Third, dummy variables were constructed for the different types of utilities.
This study did not focus on one specific type but rather included data from four
different utility categories-electric, natural gas, telecommunications, and water. The
logit model was run using dummy variables for the first three along with the original
variables. When compared with the original model, the resulting equation had a chisquare of 1.794 with three degrees of freedom. It was not significant at the .05 level
so that the alternative model fails to pass the chi-square test and dummy variables for
utility categories need not be included in the model.

11 For logistic regression, the chi-square test performs the same function as the
F-test in normal regression.
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It would also have been desirable to create dummy variables representing the
different individual states used in creating the model. However, this was not possible
since one of the original variables (commissioners elected by the legislature) had a
value of 1 for cases from Virginia and 0 otherwise.

Hence it would have been

identical to the variable representing Virginia and the logistic regression could not be
performed.

Only two states (Virginia and South Carolina) have commissioners

elected by the legislature.

Under this circumstance, it was judged preferable to

include one of them so as to estimate the potential impact of this method of
commissioner selection, even though there remains a possibility that the model results
could be affected by circumstances relating to specific states.
Table 24 provides the significance of the original variables calculated from
each of these alternative models. All variables that were significant in the original
model remain significant in each of these alternatives. The only variable that was not
significant in the original model that becomes significant is UTIL (the position taken
by utilities other than the applicant) when yearly dummy variables are used.

Alternative Model

The study results suggest that the position adopted by the staff has a
significant impact on the commission’s decision.

This raises some troubling

questions since the two may be interrelated. Staff members are employees of the
commission. Thus, one might suggest that the positions advocated by the staff are
merely those preferred by the commissioners based on the argument that staff has an
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Table 24
Significance of Variables Under Alternative Models

Variable

Years

Issues

Utility Type

LEG

0.5335

0.4589

0.4825

ADM

0.7895

0.7114

0.8962

ELEC

0.1569

0.0761

0.0981

ELLG

0.4021

0.7647

0.7281

CPI

0.5164

0.3671

0.3227

UNEM

0.6819

0.8907

0.9657

PDEN

0.2823

0.2907

0.3277

MANU

0.0475 *

0.0321 *

0.0259 *

RES

0.7725

0.9207

0.9465

PROX

0.4900

0.5576

0.3822

GRAD

0.6287

0.5044

0.5425

BIZ

0.3405

0.2921

0.2620

BORG

0.2476

0.3399

0.2991

GOV

0.6813

0.4007

0.4671

UTIL

0.0078 **

0.2045

0.2032

CPOL

0.8424

0.4320

0.5526

CUTL

0.1258

0.2412

0.1772
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Table 24-Continued

Variable

Years

Issues

Utility Type

CBIZ

0.0126 *

0.0213 *

0.0203 *

CRES

0.4897

0.4242

0.6441

CLAW

0.2432

0.1669

0.1514

CTIM

0.0839

0.0982

0.0990

CAGE

0.2281

0.2483

0.2587

CSTF

0.0039 **

0.0075 **

0.0049 **

SPRO

0.0028 **

0.0150 *

0.0206 *

SCON

0.0000 **

0.0000 **

0.0000 **

incentive to make decisions that are consistent with the views of commissioners. If
so, then a type of circular reasoning prevails—the staff advocates the position desired
by the commissioners; the commissioners adopt the staff position; as a result, the
staff appears to influence the decision of the commissioners when the relationship is
the reverse.
Consequently, one additional model was developed which excluded the
variables representing the staff position (SPRO and SCON).

This was done by

selecting a new data sample that includes only those issues on which the staff was
neutral. Since the staff took no position on these issues, they would not be subject
to the circular reasoning concerns discussed above. However, because the staff took
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a position on all issues in about one-third of the cases, the total sample size is only
156. The coefficients of the variables, their standard errors and significance are
shown in Table 25.

The model has a chi-square of 45.452 with 23 degrees of

freedom and is significant at the .01 level.
In part, this analysis tends to confirm prior conclusions.

The variables

measuring the proportion of commissioners with a business background (CBIZ) and
commissioners who had previously worked for the agency staff (CSTF) continue to
be significant as they were in the prior model.

In addition, the proportion of

commissioners who are lawyers (CLAW), which had not been significant in the
previous model, is significant in this one.12 The remaining variables associated with
the backgrounds of commissioners are not significant in either model.
In the prior model, the proportion of gross state product derived from
manufacturing (MANU) had been the only significant proxy variable. In this model,
that variable is not significant, but a different proxy variable, the unemployment rate
(UNEM), is significant. None of the other proxy variables is significant in either
model.
One of the most surprising outcomes of the original analysis was that none of
the variables measuring direct participation by interest groups was significant. In this
alternative formulation, the variable measuring activity by business organizations
(BORG) is significant, although the others are not.

12 The sign of the coefficient for this variable is different from what would be
predicted based upon prior research.
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Table 25
Alternative Model Without Staff Variables

Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

LEG

1.9271

2.5554

.4508

ADM

-0.8926

0.5855

.1274

ELEC

-1.5578

1.2330

.2065

ELLG

-0.6585

1.2830

.6078

CPI

-0.0148

0.0648

.8188

UNEM

-0.2455

0.1196

.0401 *

PDEN

-0.0010

0.0014

.4776

MANU

-6.5812

5.0598

.1934

0.1319

0.3147

.6750

PROX

-0.5381

0.4893

.2714

GRAD

-0.5518

0.5893

.3491

BIZ

-0.4237

0.3525

.2294

BORG

-0.9184

0.4658

.0487 *

GOV

-0.5365

0.3523

.1278

UTIL

-0.2607

0.6342

.6810

CPOL

0.0379

1.0202

.9704

CUTL

3.6389

3.0697

.2358

RES

Significance
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Table 25-Continued

Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

Significance

CBIZ

2.8298

1.0898

.0094 **

CRES

0.8197

1.8305

.6543

CLAW

2.2133

1.0954

.0433 *

CTIM

0.0308

0.1060

.7712

CAGE

0.0038

0.0444

.9317

CSTF

5.0527

2.0688

.0146 *

This alternative model, without the staff variables, increases the confidence
in the two commission background variables that are significant in both, but suggests
a need for additional research regarding those variables that are significant in one but
not the other.
Using this model to "predict" the input data following the 50% rule results in
the classification shown in Table 26. A comparison of this information with Table
13 indicates that the model without staff has approximately the same percentage of
correct predictions as the original model. In the alternative model, the number of
errors is reduced from 51 to 30, a reduction in the error rate o f 41 %.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140
Table 26
Alternative Model Predictions

Predicted = 0

Predicted = 1

Percentage

Observed = 0

30

21

58.82%

Observed = 1

9

96

91.43%
80.77%

Overall

Summary

This chapter has presented the empirical results of the study. The research
shows that the process model derived from the theories of regulation can prove to be
effective in explaining decision-making by utility regulators.

The next chapter

discusses the policy and research implications of these results.
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CHAPTER VII

POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

This study was explored those factors that impact the decision-making
processes of state utility regulators. The results of the study suggest four areas that
could have significant implications in the development of public policy and for future
research: (1) the role of the staff, (2) the role of intervenors, (3) the backgrounds
of commissioners, and (4) the method used for selecting commissioners.

Role of the Staff

The most striking finding of the study is the impact of the staff on the
commission’s decision. For the most part, the role of the commission staff has been
largely ignored both in the development of regulatory theory and in prior empirical
research. None of the theoretical models explicitly recognizes the function of the
commission staff in the regulatory process, although arguments can be constructed
within the context of these models that would incorporate the agency staff as an
element in the decision-making process.

In this study, the inclusion of the staff

variables was based on the public spirit theory that organizational decisions reflect
the values of those who are influential within the organization.

However, other

interpretations would be possible.

141
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For example, in the public choice model, well-organized interest groups
contend with each other to influence the decision of the agency toward the position
that benefits each interest. Two key factors in the public choice model are that the
groups must be well-organized (unorganized interests have little or no impact) and
that the group must have an economic interest to promote.

The staff would be

expected to meet the first condition since its purpose is to participate in the
commission’s regulatory cases and it needs to be organized to do so.
With respect to the second criterion, it is not so clear what, if any, economic
interest the staff might have in the outcome.

One possibility is that the staff is

interested in maintaining itself and its role in the process. For example, Kaserman,
Mayo, and Pacey (1993) found that the total number of commission staff and the
number of staff involved primarily in telecommunications had a significant impact on
the commission’s decision to deregulate long-distance telephone service.

Since

deregulation would presumably reduce the need for a large staff, the staff could
logically be expected to oppose deregulation—a conclusion consistent with the finding
of that study. However, fundamental decisions to regulate or deregulate are rarely
undertaken by commissions, so that this argument seldom applies and would not
apply in any of the routine rate cases included in this study. There could be some
relationship between the positions advocated by the staff and the size of the staff’s
budget, but there appear to have been no studies of this matter.
Another possible argument is that the staff takes positions that advance the
professional careers of individual staff members. This was the premise of the study
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by Coate, Higgins, and McChesney (1990) concerning the positions taken by different
groups of staff members within the Federal Trade Commission. There appear to be
no studies of state utility commissions using this premise. Along this line, one could
also argue that staff members take positions in rate cases that have the most favorable
impact on their own personal utility rates, although this impact would be no greater
than for other residential customers.
At the opposite extreme, Caudill, Im, and Kaserman (1994) identified the staff
position with the public interest model. These authors based this opinion on the
following considerations: (a) staff members are normally specialists in a technical
aspect of regulation, (b) they tend to be professionals whose tenure at the agency
exceeds that of any individual commissioner, (c) staff members are less visible to the
public than are commissioners and thus less motivated by political considerations, and
(d) their jobs are normally protected by civil service regulations.
Although there appear to be several conceptual bases which could support use
of staff variables, actual use of such variables has been limited. Of 36 quantitative
studies surveyed in Chapters III and IV that modeled dependent variables associated
with commission decisions as a function of independent variables, only six included
a variable related to the agency staff. These variables were significant in each case.
More attention has been given to the role of staff in case studies, with six of the ten
case studies focusing on this factor.
The most comprehensive analysis of the role of utility regulatory commission
staffs was undertaken by Gormley (1983). He conducted personal interviews with
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284 participants in the utility regulatory process in twelve states. They were asked
to rate the influence of eight types of actors on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 representing
very low influence and 10 representing very high influence. The average influence
rating in the twelve states is shown in Table 27.

Table 27
Perceived Influence in Utility Proceedings

Type of Participant

Influence

Commission Staff

8.15

Utility Companies

7.43

Proxy Advocates

7.03

Businesses

4.65

Grassroots Advocates

4.36

Municipalities

3.70

Labor Groups

3.05

Individual Citizens

2.81

Gormley concluded that "aside from public utility commissioners, regulatory
staff members are the most influential participants in the public utility regulatory
process. In eight of the twelve states, the staff is more influential than any outside
participant."
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The significant role played by the agency staff raises important policy issues.
The staff is the only participant in the regulatory process that works for the
commission. All others are outside of the commission’s organizational structure.
When discussing the influence of staff, this raises the question of: who is influencing
whom? Three answers are possible.
First, the most direct explanation is that the staff influences the commission.
Since the staff is the only participant that does not represent an interest group, its
positions can be characterized as representing the public interest, a stance that could
be expected to be well-received by commissioners since it conforms well with the
traditional theory underlying regulation.

In addition, the staff may have many

opportunities to exercise influence over the commissioners. According to Gormley
(1983):
The staff plays many important roles in the public utility regulatory
process. The staff educates commissioners and explains bewildering
concepts from the fields of economics, engineering, accounting, and
law. As an extension of its educational role, the staff analyzes
proposals submitted by utility companies, public advocates, and others.
In addition, the staff develops its own policy proposals and offers
recommendations to the commissioners. Although much staff activity
is behind the scenes, the staff actively participates in public hearings
on which the record of each case is based. After these hearings, the
staff interprets the positions of other parties to the commissioners, who
lack the time to read every transcript and every brief. Finally, the
staff writes the opinions rendered by commissioners, choosing precise
words that will constitute the commission’s point of view. (p. 138)
The second alternative is that the commissioners influence the staff or at least
the staff’s positions. Since the staff works for the commission, such influence might
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materialize through normal bureaucratic channels.1 Another possibility is that the
staff may know the views of the commissioners and propose positions that they
believe comport with those views. Their recommendations will therefore be adopted,
thus providing the staff with a "win" in the hearing process.
Third, neither staff members nor commissioners may be influencing each
other; rather, they may have shared values. Daniel B. Klein (1994), in an article
aptly titled "If government is so villainous, how come government officials don’t
seem like villains?", argues that the behavior of government agencies can be
explained by "belief plasticity". The individual’s belief system is subtly altered to
correspond with that commonly accepted in the organization through the development
o f day-to-day working relationships. This system of beliefs, values, and assumptions
about the world becomes part of the organization’s culture. If commissioners and
staff were to share the same belief system, then commission decisions would tend to
conform with staff recommendations even if the staff had no particular influence over
the commission.

Rather, the staff and the commission would be reaching their

decisions based upon independent, but common, frames of reference. While this
analysis may serve to illuminate the process of acquiring a belief system by new
agency employees, it does not offer an explanation of how or why that belief system
becomes incorporated into the agency’s culture or what the belief system actually

1 Delaware is the only state with a part-time utility regulatory commission. In
all other states, the commissioners are full-time employees, which suggests a
continuing interaction between commissioners and staff.
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The relationships between commissioners and staff and the impact of those
relationships upon agency decision-making have been largely unexplored.

One

potential avenue for research would be to utilize the fact that different organizational
structures are found among utility regulatory commissions.

In the most common

arrangement, the staff reports directly to the commission or its chairperson and has
the dual role of participating in cases and advising the commission informally.
However, in some states (such as North Carolina, Vermont, and Minnesota), there
is an advocacy staff, separate from the commissioners, that is responsible for
participating in cases. The commissioners retain their own technical staff to advise
them, but these personnel do not participate in cases. Barvick (1983) argues that the
traditional organizational structure creates an informal "off-the-record" decision
process that is more important than the public hearing process. Divorcing the staff
from the commissioners would alleviate this problem. In any event, an analysis of
differences in the impact of staff under the two organizational structures could shed
light on the type of relationship that exists between commissioners and staff and the
factors that may affect that relationship.
In addition to organizational structure, the tenure of commissioners could
influence the relationship between commissioners and staff. Generally, staff members
are long-term permanent employees while commissioners are relatively short-term
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elected or appointed officials.2 In cases where commissioners have had a long tenure
they would be more likely to have hired a substantial proportion of the existing staff
members. Consequently, it would be reasonable to expect that commissioners and
staff would be more likely to have coadunate values when commissioners have longer
tenure.

Role of Intervenors

A major purpose of this study was to measure the impact on commission
decisions of seven types of outside intervenors (individual residential customers,
proxy

advocates,

grassroots

advocates,

businesses,

business

organizations,

government agencies, and utilities other than the applicant in the rate case). The
surprising result was that none of these variables proved to be statistically significant.
The public choice model posits that governmental decision-makers are
responsive to well-organized interests. For research purposes, a major hurdle in this
model is defining and measuring what constitutes a well-organized interest. Most
studies using the public choice model rely on proxies rather than attempting to
measure the activity of interest groups directly. For example, Kaserman, Mayo, and
Pacey (1993) utilized a variable that measured the percentage of the state’s population
residing in urban areas based on the belief that urban populations would be easier to
organize than those widely dispersed in rural areas.

2 The average tenure of commissioners is approximately four years (National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, 1993).
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The current study uses three proxy variables of this type,3 but it primarily
relies on direct measures of the actions of formal intervenors in utility rate cases.
This approach is relatively unusual. It appears that only two studies have relied on
direct measures of intervention by outside interests. The Joskow (1972) model of the
rate of return, as authorized by the New York Public Service Commission, included
a variable that measured whether an intervenor presented testimony on rate of return
and the degree of conflict between the intervenor and the utility (significant at the .05
level). Crew, Kleindorfer, and Schlenger (1987) in their model of the rate increase
authorized for water utilities included variables for the number of intervenors in the
case (not significant) and the amount spent by those intervenors (significant in one
out of two cases).4
Direct measures of intervenors’ positions, as used in the current research,
have three main advantages over proxy measures. First, they are explicit, immediate,
and verifiable, and do not rely on plausible arguments that may or may not be
correct. It is hard to argue with the fact that an intervenor participated in a case and
indicated its position to the commission. Second, proxy variables ignore the impact
of confounding variables. For example, a proxy variable may suggest that a group

3 These are the percentage unemployment rate, the population density, and the
proportion of gross state product from manufacturing.
4 Caudill, Im, and Kaserman (1994) also developed a variable that measured the
rate of return recommended by intervenors in a rate case, but excluded it from their
economic theory of regulation model because it was correlated with other independent
variables.
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has reason to organize, but the cost of doing so may be prohibitive. The cost of
participating in a utility rate proceeding can be significant. In one case, as part of
a proposed settlement, a utility agreed to pay $7.5 million to a business organization
for its costs related to the proceeding (In re Consumers Power Co., 1992). Third,
the direct measurement approach provides explicit recognition of the positions
favored by an interest group and of those issues that are important to that group.
Proxy measures rely on the researcher’s assessment of what the group ought to
consider important (in the researcher’s view), not necessarily what the group does
consider important.
While direct measurement has significant advantages over proxy measures, it
does have one potentially significant disadvantage—the direct approach only measures
an interest group’s participation in the formal regulatory process.

It ignores any

attempt by the group to influence decisions through informal channels, such as offthe-record meetings with commissioners.

Since one of the proxy measures

(proportion of gross state product derived from manufacturing) proved to be
significant, the research results could be interpreted as supporting the proposition that
interest groups affect the regulatory process through informal rather than formal
channels. Of course, this leaves unanswered the intriguing question of why groups
would expend considerable sums on an ineffective approach, when a more influential
method may be available. It appears that additional research would be desirable on
the relationship between formal and informal channels of influence in the regulatory
process.
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Finally, there could be a relationship between the staff and the perceived
effectiveness of intervenor groups.

If the staff were to view its role as being to

represent the interests of those groups not otherwise represented in the process, then
the staff would be expected to take positions counter to those supported by active
intervenors. This could explain the lack of significance attributable to the intervenor
variables in this study.

Backgrounds of Commissioners

Variables relating to staff and intervenors focus on factors that can be brought
to bear to influence the decisions of commissioners. In addition to these variables,
eight variables were included in the model to reflect the backgrounds of
commissioners. Most of these variables were based on the public spirit concept that
a person’s decisions are determined to a significant extent by the values that one
holds.

Values are assumed to be determined, at least in part, by the person’s

background.

This approach has been used successfully in studies of other

governmental decision-makers. For example, in his study of voting by members of
the Federal Open Market Committee, Gildea (1990) used eight variables reflecting
the members’ background. Several studies have been performed of the backgrounds
of commissioners in regulatory agencies (Smith, 1978 and 1984; and Eckert 1981).
Relatively little research, though, has correlated those backgrounds with agency
performance, the exceptions being the studies by Gormley (1979) and Quirk (1981).
However, at least some commissioners indicate that their backgrounds are an
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important factor that needs to be considered. Marilyn C. O ’Leary and David B.
Smith (1989), former members of the New Mexico Public Service Commission, write
that
commissioners bring their own backgrounds to their decision making.
These backgrounds, without implying any bias, may bring a certain
point of view to the job. The most obvious is whether they have been
consumer advocates or utility employees or even whether they believe
utilities or ratepayers have been mistreated by former commission’s
decisions. A commissioner’s profession and training will affect how
he or she approaches the job. If she is a lawyer, she might be
concerned primarily with the precedential support for or the legality
of the decision. A businessman might be concerned with the effect of
the decision on the business climate, (pp. 225-226)
In the current study, decisions were found to be significantly influenced by
two factors in the backgrounds of commissioners making those decisions—whether
they were previously employed as members of the agency staff and whether they had
a business background.5

These results raise several policy and research

considerations.
First, the findings suggest that theories explaining an agency’s decision
making process as solely the product of external forces are likely to be incomplete.
Thus, factors that enter into the formation of a commissioner’s values would be a
promising focus for further research, since this is an area that has been largely
neglected.
Second, to the extent that informal rather than formal channels are used to

5 The importance of a business background may help to explain why the
proportion of gross state product derived from manufacturing was a significant
variable.
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influence commission decisions, these research findings suggest that a likely forum
for influencing rate decisions would be during the selection process for new
commissioners. If commissioners are predisposed to rule in certain ways based upon
their values and backgrounds, then interest groups would be well-advised initially to
push their preferred candidates for the commission, rather than trying to sway
unsympathetic commissioners once they are in office. Since most commissioners are
appointed rather than elected, the competition between interest groups would be
narrowly focused on the Governor’s appointment process.
Finally, the lack of significant results regarding commissioners’ political
affiliation and prior utility experience tends to reinforce prior research, which
suggested that these factors have limited impact (Gormley, 1979; Quirk, 1981; and
Navarro, 1982).

Method of Selection

The prior discussion focussed on the specific characteristics of those selected
to be commissioners without regard to the method of selection.

The conclusion

reached was that those interested in the utility regulatory process would be welladvised to focus their efforts on the selection of commissioners sympathetic to their
cause. A closely related topic is the method of commissioner selection, an area of
long-standing public dispute. Harris and Navarro (1983) note that during one twoyear span in the early 1980s, referenda or legislative activity occurred in 21 states
attempting to change the method of selection. Proponents of elected commissions
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argue that elected commissioners will be more responsive to the public.

Those

favoring appointed commissioners argue that the regulatory process will be more
rational and less politicized. Despite the significant public controversy concerning
the method of selection, only two states have actually changed in the last 30 yearsFlorida and Minnesota changed from elected to appointed commissioners.
Substantial research effort has been devoted to the question of whether the
method of selection has any impact on regulatory decisions. As indicated in Chapter
IV, the results have been inconclusive, with five studies finding that the method of
selection had a significant impact, seven finding no significant impact, and two others
finding mixed results.6 The results of this study continue the trend. The dummy
variable associated with elected commissions is not significant at the commonly
accepted .05 level that was adopted in this study; however, a level of .10 is
occasionally used and the variable would be significant at that level.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to perform an empirical test of regulatory
decision-making theories by analyzing the impact of variables derived from those
theories upon actual decisions o f regulatory commissions. The two primary theories
considered were: (1) the public choice theory, which postulates that a regulatory

6 Crain and McCormick (1984) found that elected commissions had a significant
effect on gas rates but not on electric. Mann and Primeaux (1987) found that the
method of selection had a significant impact on electric rates for some groups of
customers, but not on others.
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agency makes decisions based on the external pressures placed upon it; and (2) the
public spirit theory, which argues that an agency’s decisions reflect the values of
those with authority or influence within the agency. These two models represent
opposite ends of a continuum, with the public choice model focusing on external
forces while the public spirit model calls attention to internal factors.
An empirical analysis of 240 rate cases at 12 state utility regulatory
commissions over a 20 year period found that five variables were significant in
explaining the decisions reached: (1) the proportion of gross state product derived
from manufacturing, (2) the proportion of commissioners who had a business
background, (3) the proportion of commissioners who had previously worked for the
commission staff, (4) whether the commission staff favored the position advocated
by the utility, and (5) whether the commission staff opposed the position advocated
by the utility.7 Only the first variable is associated with the public choice model.
This research suggests that internal factors, particularly those associated with
the agency staff, play a relatively large role in commission decision-making. For
practitioners, who have an interest in commission decisions, the research results
suggest placing emphasis on influencing the selection of new commissioners and on
persuading the commission staff. For academics, the research results suggest that
studies of regulatory decision-making need to provide explicit recognition of internal
agency variables in order to be complete.

7 The fourth and fifth variables are not mutually exclusive because the
commission staff could be neutral.
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